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ABSTRACT
This thesis evaluates the impact of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,
Indianapolis (NAWC-ADI) efforts in restructuring itself using a matrix structure and self-managed
teams. The thesis provides background information describing the organizational change and a review
of pertinent literature regarding organizational structure, matrix organizations, self-managed teams,
and intra- and inter-team dynamics. Data were collected using in-depth interviews of 55 personnel
conducted at NAWC-ADI. The results identified themes about what is working well such as team
members being better able to implement solutions, they are more self-sufficient, they are better able
to solve problems without going through the organizational hierarchy, team members are able to
identify with the whole organizational process, some teams members are developing intra- and inter-
team skills, and that corporate information is being disseminated adequately. The results also
identified themes regarding the challenges at NAWC-ADI related to the implementation of the matrix
organization and self-managed teams. These include difficulty with intra- and inter-team skills and
the adjustment of the formal flow of communication to the new organization. The conclusion section
addresses recommendations for NAWC-ADI management in meeting its remaining challenges and
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,
Indianapolis, Indiana, (NAWC-ADI) commissioned a Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) team to conduct an assessment of its
organizational communication processes. Having undertaken a
significant reorganization in April 1992, upper level
management felt that communication gaps were adversely
affecting work effectiveness. The research of which this
thesis is a part examines communication processes as evidenced
by semi-structured interviews and questionnaire data obtained
from NAWC-ADI employees. Two theses have been collaboratively
prepared as part of this research activity and have common
background and literature review chapters. The qualitative
data obtained from interviews is the focus of this thesis; the
quantitative data is the focus of the other (Ford, 1993).
A. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis will examine the perceived impact on NAWC-
ADI's organizational dynamics resulting from the transition of
NAWC-ADI from a bureaucratic structure to a matrix structure
using self-managed teams. The research questions are as
follows:
"* How has the matrix structure affected NAWC-ADI?
"* How is the move to self-managed teams affecting NAWC-ADI?
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B. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis is divided into six chapters. This chapter is
followed by Chapter II, which provides a comprehensive
background for NAWC-ADI, its organization, and an overview of
recent research conducted in the organization. Chapter III is
a review of the literature pertinent to this study. Chapter
IV describes the qualitative methods used to analyze the
interview data. Chapter V outlines the results of the
qualitative analysis. Conclusions and recommendations are
delineated in Chapter VI.
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II. BACKGROUND
A comprehensive background of NAWC-ADI is provided in this
chapter, including a description of its current mission,
organization-wide structural changes, and relevant research
done within the organization since the restructuring. The
objective is to provide a context to frame the environment in
which this research was conducted.
A. DESCRIPTION OF NAWC-ADI
NAWC-ADI was first established as a Naval ordnance plant
in 1942. Since that time, it has developed into the Navy's
primary research and development organization for advanced
aviation electronics (avionics). NAWC-ADI is one of the
commands within the Naval Air Warfare Center organization
under the control of the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR).
An organization chart is provided in Appendix A. While NAWC-
ADI does have contracts with the U.S. Marine Corps, Army, and
Air Force, the majority of their contracts come from Naval
Aviation. NAWC-ADI is involved with integrated avionics
management, engineering, acquisition, technology insertion,
and manufacturing. These enterprises include pilot and
emergency production, electronic system design, transition to
3
production and manufacturing, and data documentation for
commercial production.'
NAWC-ADI's facilities include a 14-acre main building, a
621,000 square foot manufacturing/assembly facility and $350
million of capital equipment. The majority of the 3,200
civilians in the work force consists of engineers, scientists,
technicians, and skilled craftsmen.
As a previously operated Naval industrial fund site, NAWC-
ADI now operates as a Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF)
activity. The funding for NAWC-ADI comes directly from the
contracts it has with Department of Defense (DoD)
organizations. This funding arrangement requires NAWC-ADI to
operate in a buyer-seller relationship similar to private
industry. Only by obtaining new contracts or meeting the
performance requirements of existing contracts can NAWC-ADI
receive funds to operate. Therefore, productivity and
effectiveness are critical to NAWC-ADI's existence.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Prior to April 1992, NAWC-ADI's organizational structure
was typical of most military industrial activities; a
functionally organized system with a strong vertical
hierarchy.
Within this structure, each department operated as a
"vertical chimney" with separate agenda, priorities, and
'Information from NAWC-ADI's Command Information Pamphlet
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organizational values. With the existing barriers between
departments, each director and manager approached
corporate strategy achievement by making operational
decisions solely from their functional orientation.
Communication and coordination flowed vertically, along
the established chain-of-command, but barriers between
departments inhibited lateral, inter-department
communication and coordination. (Meier, 1992)
The command structure included an executive level with special
assistants for staff responsibilities and ten separate
departments for the operational or industrial functions (see
Appendix B). Communication from upper-level management
filtered down through department heads and supervisors to the
employees, and upper-level management was informed of current
events only after many layers of managers filtered the
information.
In October 1991, faced with the growing pressure of
widespread changes within the Department of Defense, the
Commanding Officer and Executive Director established a
steering team to develop a new organizational concept of
operations. This team was given this guideline: The
organization must be process-oriented and customer-driven.
The steering team consisted of mid-level managers. The
team used the "Leverage Process" provided by a management
consulting firm, The Leverage Company (Greenwich, CT), which
had consulted with NAWC-ADI on specific issues in the past.
The Leverage process will be described in detail in section C.
With the Leverage Process as the basis of their planning
model, the steering team recommended that the best method for
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improving NAWC-ADI's organizational effectiveness and to meet
its long-term goals was to implement a command-wide matrix
organization.
The Commanding Officer and Executive Director concurred
with the recommendations and began to plan for the transition
to a matrix command structure. Four senior civilians were
selected as Avionics Group Organization (AGO) Directors.
These individuals were tasked with developing an
implementation plan. The Executive Officer was tasked with
developing a plan to incorporate the Command Staff offices and
special assistants into the new organizational structure.
Under the reorganization, one side of the matrix is
comprised of three Directorates: Design (Alpha); Acquisition
and Manufacturing (Beta); and Fleet/User Support (Gamma).
Appendix C provides a complete organizational diagram. These
directorates were further broken down into Competency Centers
(CC). These centers are responsible for providing project
teams with the resources (material, manufacturing, and
personnel) to meet project commitments. Additionally, the
centers are responsible for the development, training, and
administrative requirements of the employees within their
competency center.
The reorganization also created a Project Office, forming
the second side of the matrix. The Project Office is sub-
divided into four areas: Avionics (A), Anti-submarine Warfare
(B), Platforms (C), and Weapons Avionics (D). Each of these
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sub-areas contains multiple projects. These projects are
coordinated by a Project Leader (PL) who is tasked with
overall project success. The PL receives team members and
other resources from the various competency centers that
impact the specific project.
The Project Teams are temporary (though often long-term)
assignments, terminating when the project is complete.
Competency center personnel can be assigned to multiple
projects if their time is not fully used on a particular
project. At the end of a project, team members return to
their competency centers until they are reassigned a new
project. In the competency center the employee receives
training, works on support teams to assist with other
projects, or is temporarily assigned to other competency
centers.
The Competency Center Directors and Project Leaders are
assisted by a Competency Center Management Team (CCMT)
comprised of a Process Improvement Associate (PIA), Personnel
Development Associate (PDA), Master Scheduler (MS), and a
Futurist. These individuals provide the interface between the
competency centers and the project teams, as well as between
the various organizational levels. Levels one, two, and three
refer to the horizon perspective of the position. For
example: the AGO is considered Level 3 and is concerned with
far-horizon issues (1-2 years); the Competency Center
Directors and Associates are Level Two and are concerned with
7
mid-horizon issues (30 days to 1 year); the Project Leader and
team members are Level One and are concerned with near-horizon
issues (1-30 days).
The decision to implement the new organization in April
1992 was based on the Commanding Officer's upcoming change-of-
command. It was felt by the Commanding Officer and Executive
Director that the new Commanding Officer would be unable to
"get up to speed" quickly enough to implement the
reorganizz in before the momentum was lost. The initial
implementation was swift. On 14 April, NAWC-ADI was a
vertically driven organization. On 15 April, it was a
horizontally driven organization.
The Executive Officer completed the reorganization of the
Command Staff and special assistants in June 1992. He was
given this extra time for two reasons: (1) The staff offices
were critical in ensuring the smooth reorganization of the
rest of NAWC-ADI in April; and (2) the primary mission of the
old and new Command Staffs were not radically different, so
the impact of a more gradual reorganization would be more
manageable.
The reorganized Command Staff consists of six centers;
"* Human Resource Office - formerly Personnel, this center is
tasked with people and program development, work force
data keeping and personnel actions
"* Group Planning - this center conducts special studies,
investment and work load analysis, and develops
organizational goals and objectives.
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"* Group Ethics - this center aids in the study of group
processes at NAWC-ADI.
"* Infrastructure, Health and Safety, and Security Support -
this center is in charge of operations and military
support, facilities maintenance, safety and security,
material management, and legal support.
"* Financial Management and Business Services - this center
takes care of the accounting, budgeting, project and
management support, and planning and resource integration.
"* Group Communications - Given the radical nature of the
change, this area was tasked with developing and
maintaining a system of communications between and within
all the many newly-created teams.
C. THE LEVERAGE MODEL
The steering team in charge of developing a new concept of
operations chose the "Leverage Process" provided by the
Leverage Company (Greenwich, CT) as a model to follow in their
restructuring effort. This production-based model provided
them an ideal restructuring tool to accomplish their
objectives of being a process-oriented, customer-driven
organization. To understand the structural issues facing
NAWC-ADI, a more detailed description of the leverage process
is provided
1. Pipeline Organization Model 2
Leverage predicts that successful corporations of the
21st century will be determined by how well corporate leaders
2 The Pipeline Model and Leverage Change Process is taken
from a paper titled "The Leverage Company" submitted as a
class project for MN 4125 by Gary D. Houglan. Additional
information has been included in these two sections to better
describe Leverage's organizational processes and constraints.
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use strategic plans to manage resource rationing, structure
their organizations around "value-adding flows," re-engineer
pipeline processes, and effectively use performance goals and
measures.
Leverage's organizational model is concerned with two
resource rationing processes. First, corporations must ration
their focus on organizational competencies. As the rate of
technological change increases, organizations will not be able
to invest in all of their business areas at the same time. If
they tried, it would result in uneven development and
performance. Large organizations cannot expect to be the
industrial leaders in all of their the present enterprises.
Companies must identify which of their competencies are
core or strategic, and justify reinvestment, and which
competencies are non-core or non-strategic, and must be
let go (Nickerson, p.1).
By identifying their core competencies, corporations are
better able to maximize the essential processes within their
organization. Second, resource rationing must include an
analysis of the constraints that most significantly affect
obtaining organizational (strategic) goals in the core
competencies. Leverage's model discriminates between four
categories of constraints: physical, logistical, managerial,
and organizational/behavioral.
Constraint identification is used to determine what is
blocking process improvement. The following is a description
of the four types of constraints.
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"* PHYSICAL CONSTRAINT: an asset, facility, or capability
that cannot meet market demands for quality or quantity,
as it is currently operated.
"* LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINT: a system or procedure by which
work is planned, scheduled, assigned, moved through its
value-adding steps, inspected, counted, inventoried,
shipped and serviced. Logistical constraints cause
disrupted flow, long queue times, and unclear ownership of
the work in process.
"* MANAGERIAL CONSTRAINT: a policy, strategy, leadership
style, or performance measurement that is used to manage
the business, which itself causes the company's change
process to slow down or stop. Managerial constraints
usually stem from looking at local unit needs in isolation
from the dynamics of the entire business.
"* ORGANIZATIONAL OR BEHAVIORAL CONSTRAINT: Behavior here
means "the way we carry out our duties." Usually, when an
individual or group acts in a way that slows the change
process, they believe they are doing what the business
needs or expects them to do. Few people sabotage a change
process deliberately. Many do so without realizing it
because they do not understand the role they must play for
change to be successful. The most universal ROOT CAUSE
for such behavioral constraints is an organization
structure which does not clearly define roles and
responsibilities, and an organization culture which does
not require individual accountability. Because these
behavioral and organizational forces are inseparable, we
combine them in this category of constraints (Naval
Avionics Center, p.8).
Leverage summarizes this resource rationing process as
follows:
To apply constraint theory, a company must first set goals
for competitive performance in the eyes of major
customers, define metrics to use for tracking performance
against goals, and then force-rank possible constraints to
achieving those goals within the time-frames required. It
is important to select only one or two top constraints on
which to focus resources and investment. Think of these
top constraints as leverage points, where the most
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progress can be made for the lowest investment (Nickerson,
p.1).
Central to Leverage's organizational model is the
structure of the organization. To effectively address
pipeline velocity, organizational processes must be networked
among all competency areas involved with the work process.
The structure that best supports this networking is a
horizontal organization. By eliminating the hierarchical
structure within an organization, the functional barriers that
impede resource allocation, process design and organizational
goal accomplishment are similarly eliminated. The horizontal
organization allows for flexible resource allocation (capital
and personnel), and moves the decision-making closer to the
actual work process pipeline.
Resource rationing and organizational restructuring
will lead corporate leaders to the essential work processes to
be managed. The task then becomes process re-engineering.
Leverage identifies three primary processes that corporations
will re-engineer: Value-adding pipeline processes, decision
processes, and information processes.
The value-adding pipeline process concentrates on the
specific product/service process that is the basis for the
organization. In NAWC's case, this covers the entire process
of identifying customer need to the receipt of the material by
the customer. The decision process involves how the firm
organizes to balance the demands and supplies of the
12
organization. It also addresses technical and capital
investment issues, personnel development processes, and
establishes priorities for process improvement within the
organization. The information processes are viewed as the
established formal networks to facilitate information flows
(such as organizational policy and direction, project team
inter-communication, and communication between teams and with
organizational leaders).
Keeping the customer's requirements as the focus, the
re-engineering is to be done by the people involved with the
process ("who own the process"). The re-engineering must
account for "quality, speed, flexibility, high asset
utilization, rapid cash flow, reliance on value-adding workers
to make decisions, and use of information networks by all team
members". (Nickerson, p.1)
2. Leverage Change Process
A flow chart of the Leverage Change Process is
provided in Appendix C. The process basically consists of
three phases; (1) problem identification and analysis, (2)
solution determination and test, and (3) making the required
changes happen. A flow chart of the Leverage Change Process
is provided in Appendix C. The process starts with the
Continuous Improvement Team (CIT) identifying and analyzing
the problem. The CIT must decide why a change is needed in
the organization. It develops the "optimal/metrics" for the
overall organization. This vision is compared to the present
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to provide a baseline assessment. The CIT identifies the top
three leverage points or constraints that will limit the move
from the present baseline to the optimal. They determine who
is accountable based on che process involved and the horizon
affected by the change. The CIT defines a charter (Plan of
Actions and Milestones (POAM)) to specify goals, targets,
start and end dates, and what the metric will be.
The process is then taken over by the Continuous
Improvement Action Team (CIAT) to determine and test
solutions. The CIAT is concerned with an individual effort to
change a process rather than the overall organization. As
with the first phase, the CIAT identifies why this particular
change is needed, the optimal/metric, the present baseline,
and the top constraints to obtaining the optimal outcome. The
CIAT then market tests the constraints analysis by obtaining
feedback from the users and owners of the process. A plan for
managing the constraints is developed to eliminate the root
causes preventing the achievement of optimal implementation.
An accountability map identifies who owns the process, who is
responsible for the change and who the implementers will be.
An implementation plan works out the details of how the change
will be implemented. The implementation plan is market tested
to determine the effect of the proposed change on the work
force and to obtain feedback to refine the implementation
plan's POAM and measures.
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The third phase is managed by the implementers.
First, they pilot test the plan, gather data, and change the
plan as necessary. Second, the final plan is implemented and
monitored. This process can expand the implementation as new
data is identified and it continues to monitor and analyze the
measures of the plan. Third, the implementers monitor and
address any emerging constraints that may develop that were
not part of the original implementation plan. At this point,
the process begins again with the next constraint identified
for this particular effort.
D. PREVIOUS ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES
Two sources of organizational information obtained since
the reorganization provided additional background to this
research. These were a Quality of Work Life (QWL) Survey
conducted by NAWC-ADI's Human Resource Office in November 1992
(Hocevar, 1993) and an Employee Feedback Survey (EFS) conducted
by NAWC-ADI's Corporate Communications Office in September
1992. (Byron,et al, 1993)
The Quality of Work Life Survey provided information
concerning job satisfaction, training, equity and rewards,
teams and cooperation, factors impacting ability to do one's
job, organizational support for doing things differently, and
organizational values and trust. A 57% response rate (402
returned out of 700 distributed) was achieved for the randomly
selected sample. Results were separated into three sections;
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items with the greatest dissatisfaction, items with the
greatest satisfaction and open-ended question results.
Items with the greatest dissatisfaction were as follows:
"* Participation and planning and policy making
"* Management team concern for employee well-being
"* Clarity of employee job responsibilities
"* Acknowledgement of employee contributions
"* Fairness of work assignment
"* Ethics and moral values at the Center
"* General satisfaction
"* Feelings about careers at NAWC-ADI(Hocevar,p.18)
Items with the greatest satisfaction were as follows:
"* Meaningfulness of my job
"* Valuation of training
"* Being informed of the Center's mission/goals
"* Center encouragement for other's task completion
"* Employee support for the CST concept(Hocevar,p.18)
The open-ended questions in the survey were grouped into
two categories; QWL concerns and the impact of restructuring
on performance. QWL concerns were:
"* Job security and the future of NAWC-ADI
"* Lack of clarity regarding career opportunities
"* Concerns about promotion fairness
"* Communication and clarity of direction particularly
regarding the restructuring
"* Concerns about leadership and management.(Hocevar,p.17)
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The reorganization was seen to have affected the following
areas: "lack of role clarity, excessive meetings, too much
work as well as too little work, and problems with
communication." The reorganization was seen to have improved
the following areas: "Removal of barriers allowing greater
coordination, opportunities for self-initiative and
innovation, and self-management."(Hocevar,p.17)
The Employee Feedback Survey (EFS) questions were divided
into three sections; personnel information, organization's
structure/objectives, and organization's implementation. The
survey was completed by 179 randomly selected employees at
NAWC-ADI. An NPS work team grruped the questions into four
areas; reorganization, involvement, effectiveness, and
communication. The involvement group had the most positive
mean, and was comprised of questions designed to evaluate a
respondent's sense of belonging to the organization. The
effectiveness group had the most negative mean, and asked
respondents to agree or disagree with various statements
concerning accountability, personnel development, and
confidence in top management.
Items with the greatest disagreement were as follows:
"* I participate in the decision making process.
"* The organization eliminates internal communication and
cooperation barriers.
"* The Competency Centers provide effective personnel skill
development opportunities.
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0 The organization provides opportunities for career
development and advancement.
Items with the greatest agreement were as follows:
0 More teamwork is occurring.
* Teamwork makes others successful.
* The organization's primary focus is customer satisfaction.
* Having a single point of contact for the customer results
in better communication. (Byron, 1993)
Both of these surveys identified areas of concern for
NAWC-ADI. The apparent lack of information regarding career
development opportunities and basic job responsibilities is
mentioned several times, along with a general feeling of
communication deficiency and being excluded from the decision
making processes at the center. These themes are used by the
researchers in the development of an Organizational




As stated previously, NAWC-ADI identified, through the
Leverage Process, that its organizational structure was the
major constraint to improving organizational effectiveness.
Since the reorganization, NAWC-ADI has become concerned that
their communication processes were not operating effectively.
A systems approach was chosen to examine NAWC-ADI's
organizational components that allow the researcher to observe
how the structural change may have affected different systems
components including communication processes. Without
alignment between its components, an organization will be
unable to optimize its effectiveness.
A brief description of systems models will provide a
context for examining the primary structural changes that have
been implemented at NAWC-ADI: on matrix organizational design
and self-managed teams. The matrix section will discuss
structural configuration in regards to employee reactions, and
possible inefficiencies within matrix organizations. It will
identify the need to match organizational norms and values
with the matrix structure. Additionally, the preferred basic
conditions for a matrix organization, the need for an
assimilated organization (of structure, systems, culture and
behavior), the characteristics of mature matrix organizations
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and the personnel in the organization, and several
"pathologies" found in matrix organizations will be presented.
The final portion of the matrix section will review articles
dealing with research conducted on matrix organizations. The
literature on self-managed teams will provide several concepts
and factors involved in the effective operation of teams in an
organization.
The final section of the literature review will present a
set of assumptions, based on the information contained in the
literature review, that the researcher would expect to observe
in the data collect at NAWC-ADI.
A. ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS MODEL
To understand an organization's ability to change, one
must first develop a concept of what an organization is. Beer
(1988) states that the critical dimensions of organizational
change consists of the amount of dissatisfaction within an
organization, the model of the organization, and the process
for changing the organization. The effects of the change
process are determined by the interaction between these
dimensions. (The value of a change must compare the ultimate
effects of change with the cost of change). The definition of
an organizational model is central to the change process.
Without a model, any attempt at analysis is limited by the
experience of the manager. The manager's solution may be to
solve new problems with solutions that have worked in the
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past, instead of analyzing all of the appropriate dimensions.
Beer states,
Too often change efforts to improve the organization
specify only one or two of these dimensions, usually
strategy and structure, ignoring the behaviors, attitudes
and competencies required for the new organization to
work. (p. 3)
Authors of organizational systems models agree that
organizations are composed of separate components that
interact with their environment and among themselves. In
discussing organizational models, Lippitt, Langseth, and
Mossop (1985) present a "Seven-Box Diagnostic Model for
Analyzing an Organization's Needs." The components of the
model are as follows; organizational context, outputs
(organizational, group and individual), organizational
culture, task requirements, fornal organization, people, and
physical setting and technology. This model allows for
interaction between all of the components listed above and
provides the researcher with a systematic approach to analyze
an organization.
Nadler and Tushman (1991) acknowledge the importance of
open-systems theory in making the manager aware of basic
organizational models. However, they state:
While systems concepts are useful as an overall
perspective, they do not help the manager systematically
diagnose specific situations or help him/her apply
research results to specific problems. A more concrete
model must be developed that takes into account system-
theory concepts and processes and helps the manager deal
with organizational reality. (p. 548)
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Nadler and Tushman's model consists of inputs, transformation
processes and outputs. Organizational inputs pertain to
environmental inputs, resources, and strategy. The
transformation processes involve task components, individual
components, organizational arrangements, and the informal
organization. The nature of outputs contained in this model
include individual behavior and effect, group and intergroup
behavior, and system-functioning (how well the system is
attaining its goals, utilizing its resources, and adapting).
However, the researcher or manager must not settle for a
simple listing of the components contained in a model, but
must understand the dynamic relationships between the model's
components. The importance of Nadler and Tushman's model lies
not in the specific listing of the components, but their
concentration on the idea of "congruence."
The model focuses on the critical system characteristic of
dependence. Organizations are made up of components or
parts that interact with each other. These components
exist in states of relative balance, consistency, or "fit"
with each other. The different parts of the organization
can fit well together and thus function effectively; or
fit poorly, leading to problems. Given the central nature
of fit in the model, we shall talk about it as a
congruence model of organizational behavior, since
effectiveness is a function of the congruence of the
various components. (p. 548)
This concept of congruence is central to analyzing an
organization's effectiveness. The idea of fit is of
particular interest to the manager in regard to the
transformation processes since this is where he/she operates.
Nadler and Tushman present a "Congruence Hypothesis."
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Other things being equal, the greater the total degree of
congruence of fit between the various components, the more
effective will be organizational behavior at multiple
levels. Effective organizational behavior is defined as
behavior which leads to higher levels of goal attainment,
utilization of resources, and adaptation. (p. 554)
This implies that if researchers want to understand what is
occurring within an organization they must identify the
inconsistent fits among the components. In addressing this
issue of congruence, the manager must consider how effective
their solution will be in correcting problems of fit between
components instead of trying to solve a particular problem.
Tichy (1983) identifies similar components in his
organizational model. These components or change levers are
external interface, mission, strategy, managing organizational
mission/strategy processes, task, prescribed networks,
organizational processes (communication, problem solving, and
decision making), people, and emergent networks.
Tichy's organizational systems model accounts for three
additional organizational dynamics; the technical, political,
and cultural views. These aspects present different problems
for the organization. Tichy summarizes the design problems as
follows:
"* The Technical Design Problem: Organizations face a
production problem. Social and technical resources must
be arranged to produce desired output.
"* The Political Allocation Problem: Organizations face an
allocation of power and resource problem. The uses to
which the organization is put as well as who reaps the
benefits.
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0 The Cultural/Ideological Mix Problem: Organizations are
held together by a normative glue-- shared beliefs.
Organizations must determine what values need to be held
by what people. (p. 8)
Tichy refers to the combination of these three aspects as a
"strategic rope." He states that it is difficult to determine
the differences between the three from casual observation.
However, he sees the role of the manager as preventing the
unravelling of this strategic rope.
Because of the dynamic nature of organizations,
differences exist in the amount of attention and effort given
to any one aspect of the organization. This shifting focus
results in cyclical manifestations for the technical,
political, and cultural aspects of an organization. The role
of the manager is to make changes in the organization's
components (mission, task, people, etc.) to affect these three
systems.
The strategic change management task is to keep the
organization internally aligned and aligned with its
external environment ...... Regardless of whether or not it
is explicitly and consciously aligned, organizations are
proposed to be effective to the extent that there is
alignment within each system - technical, political, and
cultural - and across the three systems. (Tichy, 1983 pp.
117-118)
The matrix of components (change levers) and the management
areas (technical, political, and cultural) present the manager
with the ongoing task of seeking to align all aspects of the
organization to reduce the levels of uncertainty within and
between each system. As a result of its cyclic nature,
uncertainty in the systems will occur at different times. A
24
response is triggered to address the specific problem.
According to Tichy, this response will affect all three
systems and must be considered in light of its effect on
strategic alignment.
Systems models provide the researcher with a much broader
view of organizations than previous classical bureaucratic
models or the human relations models. In additie- to
identifying diverse components within an organization, systems
models highlight the importance of congruence or strategic
alignment between the components.
B. MATRIX ORGANIZATIONS
A major component of organizational systems is the
coordinating mechanism that provides the framework for
organizational activity. Mintzberg (1983) concluded that
mechanisms and parameters fall into "natural clusters, or
configurations."
Now we take up the configuration hypothesis, which
postulates that effective organizations achieve an
internal consistency among their design parameters as well
as compatibility with their situational factors -in
effect, configuration. (p. 152)
Mintzberg identifies five separate configurations of structure
and situation: Simpie Structure, Machine Bureaucracy,
Professional Bureaucracy, Divisionalized Form, and Adhocracy.
He states that organizations do not merely react to
situational factors, but must be seen from the systems
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approach as being "gestalts' that interact among themselves
and with their environment.
Organizations that are complex and dynamic and seek to
capitalize on innovation and creativity represent an Adhocracy
configuration.
In Adhocracy, we have a ... highly organic structure, with
little formalization of behavior; high horizontal job
specialization based on formal training; a tendency to
group the specialists in functional units for housekeeping
purposes but to deploy them in small, market-based project
teams to do their work; a reliance on the liaison devices
to encourage mutual adjustment, the key coordination
mechanism, within and between these teams; and selective
decentralization to and within these teams, which are
located at various places in the organization and involve
various mixtures of line managers and staff and operating
experts. (p. 254)
The Adhocracy tends to ignore the traditional unity of command
aspect of organizations and group activities into matrix
structures. Concentrating on its client's problems, operating
and administrative requirements are "blended into a single
effort." In this configuration functional, project and
integrating managers serve as liaison devices between groups.
Strategic issues are addressed lower in this configuration
than others. As such, top managers are occupied with
monitoring projects, acting as a liaison with the external
environment, and dealing with the problems that might surface
as a result of the fluid nature of Adhocracies. The
conditions of an Adhocracy is that it is dynamic and complex.
This complexity encourages the organization to develop
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"differentiated work constellations" to address the different
and frequent product changes faced by the organization.
Mintzberg notes three issues that are associated with
Adhocracy. First, people may have negative reactions to the
ambiguity and conflict found in the Adhocracy. While it does
provide for greater "democracy with less bureaucracy," the
dynamic nature of a ever-changing organization does take its
toll on personnel.
Second, inefficiencies may develop in the Adhocracy. If
used to accomplish "ordinary things," it will not be as
efficient as other configurations. The Adhocracy is designed
to address complex and dynamic issues. This requires greater
communication and this has a time and financial cost
associated with it. Additionally, unbalanced workloads may
exist between the periods when one project is ending and
before another project starts. This temporary excess capacity
can result in a drain on cash reserves.
Third, faced with the conflict, ambiguity, and perceived
inefficiencies, some organizations may try to transition to a
more bureaucratic configuration. This reversion to more
traditional forms will not lead to increased effectiveness if
the goal of standard policies and operating procedures is
achieved at the cost of aligning the organization's
configuration with its internal and external environment.
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Bartlett and Ghoshal (1992) have stated that the problems
faced by a matrix organization are not one of goals, but one
of process:
The problem was that they defined their organizational
objectives in purely structural terms. Yet the term
formal structure describes only the organization's basic
anatomy. Companies must also concern themselves with
organizational physiology - the systems and relationships
that allow the lifeblood of information to flow through
the organization. They also need to develop a healthy
organizational psychology - the shared norms, values, and
beliefs that shape the way individual managers think and
act. (p. 372)
Bartlett and Ghoshal state that an organization's corporate
vision must be clearly communicated, personnel must identify
with the corporate goals resulting from the vision, and
personnel must be developed to integrate their thinking and
activities into the larger corporate agenda. The goal is
expressed by a senior executive they interviewed: "The
challenge is not so much to build a matrix structure as it is
to create a matrix in the minds of our managers." (p. 380)
Davis and Lawrence (1977) have provided an extensive
overview of matrix organizations. They define matrix
organizations as:
any organization that employs a multiple command system
that includes not only a multiple command structure but
also related support mechanisms and an associated
organizational culture and behavior pattern. (p. 3)
Davis and Lawrence state that a matrix structure is preferred
when three basic conditions exist simultaneously. As outside
pressures develop for dual focus on such issues as function,
product, or location, a dual command structure is needed to
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provide for a balance of power between the different focus
areas. The pressure for high information-processing capacity
is also a condition of matrix development. As uncertainty in
the external environment, complexity of organizational tasks,
and the interdependency among organizational groups increase
the need for high information-processing capacity increases.
The third basic condition for matrix adoption is increased
pressure for shared resources. Pressures of economies of
scale require a system to maximize scare resources. The
matrix organization provides flexibility by allowing personnel
and machinery to be shifted from project to project to meet
organizational demands.
For Davis and Lawrence a matrix organization is more than
structure, they include "Matrix Structure + Matrix Systems +
Matrix Cultural + Matrix Behavior." All four components are
required to adequately address the basic conditions listed
above by:
(1) the focusing of undivided human effort on two (or
more) essential organizational tasks simultaneously, (2)
the human processing of a great deal of information and
the commitment of the organization to a balanced reasoned
response (a general management response), and (3) the
rapid redeployment of human resources to various projects,
products, services, clients, or markets. (p. 21)
This can only be accomplished if all aspects have been
assimilated into the total matrix organization.
Mature matrix processes involve power shifts from old
hierarchical structures to dual command structures, location
shifts from functional to project arrangements, and a focus on
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product innovation. Flexibility is the key characteristic of
matrix organizations. They capitalize on the economies of
scale provided by larger organizations, while utilizing the
creativity of smaller project teams. As the organization
learns to combine, focus, and refocus all aspects of the
organization, resistance to change is decreased.
The role of management within the matrix organizazion is
different than other organizational configurations. The top
leadership role is to balance power within the dual command
structure, manage the decision making context, and to set the
standards of acceptable performance and behavior. The matrix
area bosses (functional and project) must develop new
managerial perspectives. Recognizing that they have lost some
control over production units, functional managers focus on
establishing communication channels with the project managers
to become more customer-oriented. The project manager assumes
a general executive approach to management. They must
integrate all functional members into one team in the interest
of the project. This integration is accomplished through
influencing, persuasion, and communicating instead of direct
authority since authority is shared with the functional
manager. The most challenging position is that of the 2-boss
manager. Given that they are held accountable by the
functional manager and the project manager, the potential for
conflict is high. However, by assuming a general management
perspective the 2-boss manager is capable of influencing the
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organization to a much greater extent than in the hierarchical
organization, they have two organizational avenues instead of
one.
Matrix organizations place greater demands on individuals
than other configurations. The success of a matrix will
relate directly to how well the organization helps its
personnel function in the new system. Because of increased
interaction and communication, diversity within the
organization will surface more often. This diversity will
lead to conflicts between individuals and it must be
confronted. The conflict is not a problem; it is the manner
in which it is dealt with. Conflict management skills are
essential for matrix organization.
The assumption in a matrix is that this conflict can be
healthy and that higher quality solutions will develop if
people with different expertise and orientations relating
to a given task get together and thrash out their
differences. (Davis and Lawrence, p. 104)
Individuals are required to collaborate more frequently in a
matrix. For effective collaboration to occur, trust must be
develop throughout the organization (horizontally and
vertically). Open relationships built on trust must be
actively developed. Individuals throughout the organization
have to be capable of utilizing sophisticated problem solving
skills. Normally only required of top managers, matrix
organizations mandate that the lowest levels make corporate
decisions. Lower level managers are faced with analyzing
qualitative and quantitative corporate information, and
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weighing short and long range considerations in an environment
full of uncertainty.
Not all individuals may be capable of adjusting to matrix
organizations. The organization has the responsibility to
develop its personnel.
It is not sufficient to merely tell people that they will
be shifting from being a conventional line manager to a
manager in a matrix. If they are to be effective, they
must quickly build effective working relationships with
the others in the matrix. It is too risky to let chance
events in their contact form the character and process of
the group. (Davis and Lawrence, p. 109)
Davis and Lawrence feel that team building will assist the
team in understanding the common expectations of all members.
Such issues as group objectives, meeting times, roles and
responsibilities of members, leadership roles, decision making
procedures, conflict resolution, and interactions with
functional areas should be clarified at the outset of team
development. Individually, managers need to receive training
in management philosophy, matrix organizations, effective
communication, group processes, and new business skills
(corporate processes such as project funding and budgeting).
Simulations and monitored teambuilding will augment the
learning process. The organization reinforces the matrix
concept through its selection criteria, performance
appraisals, and career development. A matrix is a stressful
environment, but with individual and group training (plus
organizational reinforcement) individuals obtain greater
levels of freedom and power. This new freedom can lead to
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heightened levels of commitment and motivation that results in
higher individual productivity and greater organizational
effectiveness.
Davis and Lawrence have identified several common
pathologies in matrix organizations. "Power Struggles" are
more common, because shared power is inherent in matrices.
The role of balanced power is essential to prevent power
struggles.
If processes are not controlled or informal processes are
allowed to coordinate critical tasks, "Anarchy" may result.
This comes from a lack of appreciation that a matrix is a
"definite structure and not a 'free form' organization."
(Davis, p. 133) Critical tasks require explicit arrangements.
"Groupitis" can develop if the idea of matrix is
understood to mean that all project decisions must be made by
a unanimous vote during group meetings. To prevent this,
groups must be trained in the characteristics of matrix
organizations and develop ground rules during the teambuilding
stage regarding decision processes.
"Collapse during economic crunch" also occurs to matrix
organizations. The only preventive measure for this is
management commitment. If the organization is not going to be
committed, it is much better not to engage in matrix
operations. Once management retreats from their commitment,
it will not be able to return to a matrix system because trust
in management is essential in matrix organizations.
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"Excess overhead" has been found in the early stages of
matrix development; however these costs disappear as the
matrix matures. Management does contribute to this problem by
filling every position with full-time employees. Assigning
managers to multiple roles can reduce overhead cost.
"Decision strangulation" may occur in matrix organizations
due to constantly clearing decisions through the functional
areas, escalating all conflicts to higher levels, and
reliance on unilateral decision style by one manager. To
prevent clearing decisions, team members must be empowered by
the functional areas to make decisions, otherwise there is no
need for a matrix system. Managers must reinforce the
necessity of conflict management at the lower levels by
requiring individuals to solve any problem that belongs in
their sphere of responsibility. To prevent unilateral
decision making from interfering with the decision process,
the organization must ensure that managers understand that
bilateral decision making is the accepted practice. Anyone
who is operating in a unilateral style, "must rework their
concept of decision making or look for employment in a non-
matrix organization." (Davis, p. 140)
"Sinking" reflects an organization that has trouble
maintaining the matrix at higher levels, but has been
incorporated at the lower levels. This will result in
confusion, miscommunication, and frustration. To prevent
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this, a complete conceptualization of the matrix organization
must be developed and implemented.
"Layering" is when the matrix fever begins to take over
all aspects of an organization regardless of effectiveness.
Matrices within matrices can become more of a burden then the
problem they were designed to correct. Again, an adequate
conceptualization will prevent this from occurring. "Navel
gazing" refers to an organization who has lost touch with the
outside world (or customer), because of focusing solely on its
internal disputes. Generally, this is the result of having to
address other pathologies. By preventing those other problems
from occurring, less attention will be focused internally.
Mintzberg, Bartlett and Ghoshal, and Davis and Lawrence
have provided a conceptual overview of matrix organizations.
The remaining portion of this section will address research
articles regarding matrix organizations and project groups
working in research and development arenas.
Burns and Wholey (1993) addressed the reasons that
organizations adopt and abandon matrix management programs.
They examined 1,375 hospitals that had been involved in matrix
programs. They found that for those hospitals adopting a
matrix program, external factors (such as the prestige of the
organization within its professional network, regional
pressure by hospitals that had already adopted matrix
programs, and the degree of status conferred on the
organization by its professional network) played a significant
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role in the organizations studied. In addition to influencing
technological innovation, external organizational networks
influenced administrative innovation. This relates to the
status and prestige that can result from implementing a
program that is favored by the professional circle of the
organization. Internal factors are dominant in deciding to
abandon a matrix program. Financial problems, staffing
problems (such as turnover and development), and political
opposition were the leading dynamics involved in the
abandonment of matrix programs. A special note was provided
by Burns and Wholey in regard to political opposition by the
lower-level managers. Plant managers and first line
supervisors may view the transfer of power to project teams as
a loss of power. They may resent having to work with team
members in "collegial, consultative relationships."
Joyce (1986), conducting a social experiment in the
effects of matrix structure, determined communication
processes, role perceptions, and work attitudes were affected
by the introduction of a matrix structure into an engineering
division of an aircraft manufacturing firm. Three groups
within the engineering division were studied; engineering (33
participants), drafting (21 participants), and a control group
(25 participants). The key variable explaining the degree of
variance in communication, roles and attitudes was the amount
of change implemented by the matrix. For example, the less
familiar the division was with team assignments, the greater
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the physical relocation, and the more abrupt the introduction,
the greater the negative impact on the organization. In
regard to communication, frequency did increase, but quality
(as it pertains to participative and directive behavior of
participants toward problem solving) was rated as lower by one
of the two divisions studied:
Although the reorganization brought predicted improvements
in the quantity of communications in one experimental
group, the change unfavorably affected the quality of
communications, and corresponding decreases in
coordination occurred. This suggests that implementing a
matrix structure must favorably affect both quantity and
quality of communications for it to result in such
desirable outcomes as improved coordination. (Joyce, p.
552)
After six months, role ambiguity, job involvement,
satisfaction with; work, supervision, co-workers, pay and
promotions all showed slight decreases for one group
(engineers) and sharp decreases for the group (drafters) which
experienced greater upheaval in the implementation.
Addressing the balance of power in matrix organizations,
Katz and Allen (1985) determined that a clear distinction was
needed between the project and functional manager. Deriving
their data from the study of nine R&D organizations (public
and private) they determined that instead of attempting to
equalize the power of each manager, the differences in their
positions required them to have different spheres of
influence. The only joint aspects of their influence should
be in the areas of salaries and promotions. The project
manager must be concerned with the outside pressures of the
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customer and the coordination of the different functional
representatives on the project. The functional manager has to
concentrate on the technical aspects of his/her specific area
to ensure that excellence and state of the art technology
supports the project.
The findings imply that it is not through mutual balance
or joint responsibilities along single dimensions of
influence that the matrix should be made to work, but
rather that the matrix should be designed and organized
around more explicit role differentiation among dimensions
of influence. (Katz and Allen, p. 84)
Barker, Tjosvold, and Andrews (1988) investigated the role
of conflict management on matrix organizations among 315
engineers and technologists in a western Canada utility firm.
They determined that those managers who were co-operative and
confirming of conflict were more successful in handling
conflict than those who tried to compete with it or avoid it.
These damaging effects of conflict are much more likely to
occur when a project manager attempts to win conflicts
when that is possible (competitive mode). Conversely, the
constructive effects of conflict are much more apt to
occur when a project manager confirms the competence of
the team members (confirming mode) and establishes a win -
win atmosphere where people argue freely about the best
ways to attain the essential goals of all persons involved
(co-operative mode). (p. 176)
Barker and Tjosvold suggest that it is not essential for every
project manager to have the qualities described above, but
they must ensure that someone on the team does have these
qualities and is given the leeway to manage team conflict.
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In studying 32 project groups in a R&D division of a major
corporation, Keller (1986) determined that group cohesiveness
was the best predictor of project team performance.
The findings suggest that cohesive project groups were
able to achieve high project quality and meet their goals
on budgets and schedules. (p. 723)
Innovative orientation, as determined by an adaption-
innovation inventory to measure "ability to do things
differently," was also an important predictor of project
quality, but did not appear to be important for budgeting and
scheduling performance. The importance of group cohesiveness
suggests that team development, physical location, supportive
leadership, and stable group memberships should be facilitated
by the organization to increase project performance.
C. SELF-MANAGED WORK TEAMS
This section presents a discussion of the benefits and
characteristics of self-managed teams. It describes
organizational conditions which affect group effectiveness and
review the importance of group cohesiveness, size and
communication within groups. A brief discussion of inter-
group dynamics is also provided. Finally, this section
addresses the impediments to group effectiveness and the
limitations of self-managed teams.
Self-managed work teams are specialized work teams. Self-
managed teams often arrange schedules, hire and fire team
members, manage budgets, and deal with customers. Since the
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basic premise is to have the team manage itself, the
requirement for lower and middle management decreases. In
today's environment of downsizing and streamlining, creating
self-managed teams may reduce labor cost and increase
efficiency.
Self-managed teams are capable of addressing more
complicated projects than the traditional functional approach,
because of the combination of multi-functional experts into
one team. Since team members are better able to see the
results of their efforts from start to finish, they are able
to take on more responsibility for the success of the project.
This can have the additional benefit of creating a more
motivated team. Aside from the multi-functional expertise
that teams have, a synergistic benefit can result. Team
members are in a better position to cross-train for additional
technical skills, they can develop an awareness of
interpersonal group dynamics, and can begin to develop new
perceptions about a project that would not have developed in
their old functional paradigm.
Hackman (1990) presented three characteristics to better
define work groups. These concepts included a definition of
work groups; a definition of group effectiveness; and a
orienting conceptual framework. According to Hackman, work
groups have the following characteristics:
* They are intact social systems, complete with boundaries,
interdependence among members, and differentiated member
roles.
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"* They have one or more tasks to perform. The group
produces some outcome for which members have collective
responsibility and whose acceptability is potentially
assessable.
"* They operate in an organizational context. This means
that the group, as a collective, manages relations with
other individuals or groups in the larger social system in
which the group operates. (Hackman, 1990, p. 4)
Hackman contends that group effectiveness is a three-
dimensional conception that will vary according to the
significance of different circumstances. These dimensions
are:
"* The degree to which the group's productive output meets
the standards of quantity, quality, and timeliness of the
people who receive, review, and/or use that output.
"* The degree to which the process of carrying out the work
enhances the capability of members to work together
interdependently in the future.
"* The degree to which the group experience contributes to
the growth and personal well-being of team members.
(Hackman, 1990, pp. 5-7)
The orienting framework for studying or managing teams is
best thought of in terms of "the creation of conditions that
support effective team performance." (Hackman, 1990, p. 9)
The process criteria of effectiveness includes (1) ample
effort, (2) sufficient knowledge and skill, and (3) task-
appropriate performance strategies. Organizational conditions
affect the group's ability to perform effectively: group
structure (including task structure, group composition, and
core norms); supports and reinforcement (including reward
systems, educational systems, and information systems); and
expert coaching and process assistance to maximize effort and
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commitment, knowledge and skill, and creative performance
strategies. (Hackman, 1990, pp. 7-14)
Hackman (1990, pp. 479-493) discusses four additional
themes that applied to work groups. The time constraints and
rhythm of the groups are important. As deadlines and time
requirements are made clearer, groups become more effective.
Effective groups develop a rhythm to their work activities.
The second theme is a "self-fueling spiral." The is simply a
version of the self-fulfilling prophesy. This is where a team
or individual is labeled as ineffective, treated as such, and
soon begins to perform in an ineffective manner. The reverse
would be true for an effective team. Authority is also seen
as an important characteristic of group effectiveness. The
amount and stability of a group's authority, and the timing
and focus of external authority interventions affect group
effectiveness. The work content or "stuff" (Hackmax., 1990, p.
487) that the group is engaged with shape group dynamics. The
differences between production teams and management teams
effectiveness may have as much to do with the type of
information or "stuff" that they deal with, than with the
differences in personnel or backgrounds. A group, over time,
will begin to align with their "stuff". This group alignment
can lead to greater group cohesion or to group tunnel vision
about their role in the organization.
The specificity of group goals and accuracy of performance
feedback have been found to increase work group cohesiveness.
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(Koch, 1979) Cohesiveness, in turn, has been positively
linked to performance in self-managed work teams. (O'Keefe,
Kernaghan, and Rubenstein, 1975) Cohesiveness based on team
members' attraction to the task may improve their commitment
to group goals, their ability to coordinate through common
understanding, and their level of participation in group
process. This improved level of commitment to group goal
accomplishment should lead to increased effectiveness.
(Goodman, Ravelin, and Schminke, 1978) Group size can affect
the effectiveness of group projects. O'Reilly and Roberts
(1977) examined 43 small to medium-sized groups (3-53 members)
in three naval aviation units. While an optimal size group
was not given, they determined that:
As group size increased, the possibility for group
connectedness decreased because of limitations on the
amount of effort that an individual can spend interacting
with an increasing number of others. (p. 677)
Another important finding was that information accuracy and
communication openness were strongly related to group
effectiveness.
A variation of self-managed teams is a multi-disciplinary
(cross-functional) project team similar to project teams at
NAWC-ADI. These multi-disciplinary teams address the issue of
"organized complexity." Projects that cannot be solved by a
single discipline or functional area can be undertaken by a
team of experts representing a multitude of functional areas.
Multi-disciplinary team structure is based on dual
assignments of organizational members to both functional
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areas [competency centers at NAWC-ADI] and project teams.
Individuals may be involved in one or more project teams
at a time, while continuing to report to their discipline
section [competency center]. As a result, members
operating in this design system may have multiple
reporting relationships. (Uhl-Bien and Graen, 1991, pp.
3-4)
Since team members are not technical experts in all areas of
a project, it is important that they collaborate with each
other to integrate all discipline areas required for a
specific project. (Uhl-Bien and Graen, 1991)
The success of self-managed teams can not be determined
solely by their intra-team aspects. Ancona and Caldwell
(1990) have done extensive research in the area of "boundary
management," the process by which teams manage their
interactions with other parts of the organization. This
process deals not only with communication or interactions that
the team initiates but also to how the team responds to input
from others. They separate team members' behavior into four
distinct patterns of activity:
"* AMBASSADOR - activities directed at representing the team
to others and protecting the team from interference.
Usually aimed at the upper levels of the organization.
"* TASK COORDINATOR - activities aimed at coordinating the
team's efforts with others. People taking on these
activities communicate laterally rather than up the
organization. (Also called SENTRY in further studies).
"* SCOUT - activities aimed at obtaining information for the
group. These are most important in the early stages of
the group's formation.
"* GUARD - activities aimed at keeping information and
resources inside the group.
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It was discovered that high-performing product development
teams generally carry out more external activity than low-
performing teams. More specifically:
... high levels of Scout activity are only important early
in the process, while ambassador and task coordinator
activity remain linked to performance throughout the
product development cycle. Members of high performing
teams did not simply react to communications from others;
they were more likely to be the initiators of
communication with outsiders than those individuals on
low-performing teams. (Ancona and Caldwell, 1990)
Ancona (1990) described three types of external group
interactions. These are informing, parading, and probing
interactions.
... Probing teams, manipulate the environment; they leap
before they look, perform trials to learn what an error
is, and discover what is feasible by testing presumed
constraints. This approach allows for accommodation to a
complex, changing environment. In contrast, like parading
teams, are more passive; they accept the information that
their environment provides, thus limiting their
perspective. Informing teams are even more isolated. (p.
357)
Probing teams have the advantage of identifying and
understanding external demands, while promoting themselves in
a positive manner to outside individuals and teams. As teams
become more isolated from their external environment, they
increase their probability for failure.
Sundstrom, De Meuse, and Futrell (1990) identify
organizational integration as important for group
effectiveness.
When a team's mission requires a high degree of external
integration or linkage, effectiveness depends on the pace
and timing of exchanges with other work units, as in a
production team that gets materials from the preceding
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team and provides the next operation with materials for
its work. (p. 124)
For groups which do not require significant levels of
synchronization with external groups, internal group dynamics
were a more important measure of effectiveness.
Hackman (1990) identified five common mistakes (Trip
Wires) that impede group effectiveness.
"* Call the performing unit a team but really manage members
as individuals.
"* Fall off the authority balance beam.
"* Assemble a large group of people, tell them in general
terms what needs to be accomplished, and let them "work
out the details."
"* Specify challenging team objectives, but skimp on
organizational supports.
"* Assume that members already have all the competence they
need to work well as a team. (pp. 493-504)
Hackman amplifies his concern for balancing authority in
works groups by expressing the necessity for managers to
retain control for the direction and constraints on teams,
while assigning full authority to the team for the "means by
which it accomplishes its work." (Hackman, 1990, p. 496)
Teams should not be left to "work out the details."
Instead, effective teams consist of three components.
First is a well designed team task that engages and
sustains member motivation. ... Second is a well composed
group-one that is as small as possible, that has clear
boundaries, that includes members with adequate task and
interpersonal skills, and that has a good mix of members-
people who are neither so similar to one another that they
are like peas in a pod nor so different that they have
trouble working together. ... Third is clear and explicit
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specification of the extent and limits of the team's
authority and accountability. (Hackman, 1990, p. 499)
The most effective teams require organizational support.
Supports include a reward system for teams (not individuals),
educational systems (including professional and interpersonal
training), an information system to collect and act on data
essential to task assignment, and material resources
(equipment, tools, space, etc.).
Team development does not happen by magic. A coaching or
leadership role is normally required for teams to develop into
effective units. A leader needs to be aware of the time and
focus of his interventions into the group to minimize the
disruptive factors of the intervention. A leader or manager
needs to understand that the initial development of a work
group is the most critical. It is important that the support
and assistance be directed up front if the group is to be
effective.
The role of a team leader or manager, then, involves three
kinds of activities: (1) creating favorable performance
conditions for the team, either on one's own authority or
by exercising influence upward or laterally with
managerial colleagues, (2) building and maintaining the
team as a performing unit, and (3) coaching and helping
the team in real time. (Hackman, 1990, pp. 501-503)
There are limitations to self-managed and multi-functional
teams. Costs will go down from improved quality and the
reduction in supervision required, but additional human
resource costs will appear, primarily in the area of the
additional training that will be required. Team members need
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the skills necessary to be cross-functional and flexible
within their own team. Training in group processes and
effective teamwork is vital to the success of self-managed
teams. Group process training is expensive and time-
consuming. If a skill-based pay system is used, salary
expenses go up resulting from increased training provided.
Other limitations include:
"* If an organization is composed of teams and non-team
units, conflict between the two different structures may
occur.
"* Meetings become lengthy and time-consuming, therefore
slowing down the decision making process.
"* Individual expectations of team members for a perfect
setting may be too high and could result in personal
frustration.
"* Teamwork is demanding on individuals as cooperation is
needed between team members. Personal ideas and
philosophies must be in sync or put aside for teams to
function (Lawler, pp. 111-113).
With these limitations in mind, managers must decide whether
or not to use self-managed teams, and determine the degree to
which the teams should be self-managed.
D. HYPOTHESES
While we are not hypothesis testing, based on the
literature about matrix organizations and self-managed teams
we might expect to observe several tentative hypotheses
concerning NAWC-ADI. Having transformed from a traditional
bureaucratic organization to one that has implemented a matrix
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structure and self-managed reams, these hypotheses are
presented:
1. Inconsistent fit between the matrix structure and
other organizational components.
2. People having negative reactions to ambiguity and
conflict associated with the reorganization.
3. Frustration over the use of the matrix structure, if
used for routine processes.
4. Increased levels of organizational conflict.
5. Increased teambuilding and group dynamics training.
6. Organizational efforts to reinforce the new
organization through personnel management efforts
(selection, appraisals, and development).
7. Certain types of pathologies, as identified by Davis
and Lawrence (power struggles, anarchy, groupitis,
excess overhead, decision strangulation, sinking,
layering, or navel gazing).
8. Communication frequency increases, but some
questions as to the improvement in quality of
communication (as related to participation and
direction).
9. The amount of conflict between the project and
functional managers relating to the degree of
distinction between their spheres of influence
(balance of power).
10. More positive attitudes within groups that are co-
operative and acknowledge the existence of conflict.
11. Group cohesiveness identified as the strongest
characteristic within teams that are working well
together.
12. Certain "Trip Wires," as identified by Hackman
(199C. (managing members as individuals, falling off
the authority balance beam, letting the group "work
out the details," skimping on organizational
supports, and making false assumptions concerning




The interview technique was determined to provide the best
potential for gleaning qualitative data. Using techniques
described by Downs (1988) as a starting point, the research
team developed an interview protocol (see Appendix D). The
interview protocol provided an introductory statement and laid
out general questions in the following areas:
"* How well the organization was operating.
"* How well communication and decision making processes were
working.
"* Perceptions regarding how well other organizational
members understood decision making priorities, policies,
and strategies since the reorganization.
"* Specific probing questions pertaining to organizational
horizons, learning mechanisms, and communication flow.
The interview protocol was intentionally designed to provide
the interviewer with freedom to pursue emergent topics as
identified by the person being interviewed. Additionally, the
protocol was evaluated by the interview team each evening
during the actual interview phase to adjust for topic
discoveries. Each interview lasted approximately one hour and
was conducted by one of four interviewers over a four-day
period.
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A total of 55 interviews were conducted during the week of
April 19, 1993. The majority of these interviews were done on
a one-to-one basis (with the exception of two group interviews
of four personnel and two group interviews of two personnel).
The interview team defined a stratified sample of top and low
performing teams. The specific individuals were then
identified by NAWC-ADI. The interview team monitored the
positions of the personnel being interviewed to ensure that
there was a representative sample of organizational levels and
work groups. A listing of interviews conducted by level and
work group is contained in Table 4-1. Each interview was
recorded and later transcribed to facilitate data analysis.
TABLE 4-1
INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED AT NAWC-ADI
(BY LEVEL AND WORK GROUP)
LEVEL ONE LEVEL TWO LEVEL THREE TOTAL
ALPHA 9 6 1 16
BETA 7 2 1 10
GAMMA 5 2 1 8
PROJECT OFFICE 7 4 0 11
COMMAND STAFF 6 1 3 10
TOTAL 34 15 6 55
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B. DATA ANALYSIS
The interviews were analyzed using qualitative methods
described by Glaser (1978) and Whyte and Hamilton (1965). Two
differences were noted between the methods and examples listed
above and this study. As commissioned by NAWC-ADI, the
initial research topic of communications was the focus of this
study. This directed the initial data collection and did have
a bearing on the research design. However, Glaser's ideas on
coding (discovery of underlying indicators in the data),
constant comparison (ongoing analysis), memoing (idea papers),
and identification of basic social processes instead of
factual or quantitative data were beneficial in analyzing the
interviews. A brief explanation of constant comparison and
memoing are described below. The difference between Whyte's
and Hamilton's study and this research project was that no
work or process observations were made by the interview team
at NAWC-ADI. The interviews provided the bulk of information
analyzed for this study.
The first step in the analysis was to read each interview
to determine the major issues identified by the interviewees.
As the interviews were read, topic areas began to develop.
The commonality of the data facilitated the identification of
the following topic areas; personnel management, team
building, roles and responsibilities, processes,
communication, and conflict. Throughout the analysis process,
the principle method of determining topics was a constant
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comparative process. This process requires the continuous
comparison of quotes to quotes, quotes to ideas, ideas to
ideas and all data with emerging topics. This process allows
topics to grow out of the data. Instead of establishing a
topic framework at the beginning of the analysis, the constant
comparative process allows topics to be generated from the
data that provides a greater degree of fit between the data
and the topics.
After reading the interviews and identifying the key
portions, the interviews were re-read for better clarity and
understanding. The central ideas were then highlighted for
later reference. The key highlighted excerpts that reflected
the main issues of each interview were then coded by topic(s),
organizational level, work group, assigned project, and
interview number. Next, the coded data were transferred to a
separate data file. The Wordperfect (ver.5.1) word processing
software program was used to store the data. The program
allowed the data to be sorted by any combination of the codes
listed above (see Appendix E for sorting procedures).
The first sorting (for each level) was by topic and work
group. The sorted data were reviewed to determine if the
information reflected a common topic. If it did not, the data
were re-coded to the appropriate topic or a new topic title
was created. The review allowed for the development of sub-
topics within each topic area. For example, the topic of
personnel management was further broken down into sub-topics
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for promotions/advancements, performance evaluations, and
administrative procedures. A descriptive summary was written
for each level and work group (level three was described as
one group, because of the small number of level three
interviews). The descriptive summaries were then analyzed for
similarities within and between the work groups and levels.
A second sorting was done by topic to compare with the
previous summaries. These two sources were then analyzed with
the information contained in the literature review.
The constant comparative process described above required
that idea papers or memos be written to provide a basis for
analyzing the interviews. "Memos are the theorizing write-up
of ideas about codes and their relationships as they strike
the analyst while coding" (Glaser, p. 83) Memos were used to
help the analyst gather his thoughts as the comparative
process continued. A memo was developed after the analyst
conducted his interviews, and a joint memo or flow diagram of
independent and dependent variables was developed by all
interviewers to represent the common topics identified during
the interviews. The analyst also used the memoing process
after each descriptive summary and as part of the final phase
to consolidate the topics and themes into one set of themes.
The central themes and processes identified during this




The qualitative data analysis revealed several themes that
exemplify NAWC's reorganization. The themes are broadly
broken into two categories: (1) the positive effect of the
NAWC reorganization; and, (2) the challenges still facing
NAWC. The quotes included in this section are acknowledged by
interview numbers to ensure the anonymity of the personnel
interviewed.
B. POSITIVE EFFECTS OF THE NAWC REORGANIZATION
1. Many people, particularly those within the project
teams, feel that they are working together well and
implementing solutions.
During NAWC-ADI's reorganization, the responsibility
for design, development, and manufacturing of aviation
components was taken away from specific functional areas and
given to multi-disciplinary project teams. These teams are
created to control all of the requirements of a particular
project (ex., global positioning team, or the F-18 team).
Team members are pulled from various specialty areas (or
competency centers) so that the project team has the personnel
resources to adequately develop a strategy and work plan for
a project without having to go through a bureaucratic maze of
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functional areas (as with the old management system at NAWC-
ADI).
While realizing that teams may not be able to address
all issues, team management was seen to allow for the
expression of alternatives that would not have been surfaced
in the past. Within project teams, team members are better
able to take ownership for an entire project instead of just
one functional area. By looking at a problem from a project
perspective, team members are willing to address issues and
develop solutions that may have been outside of their purview
in the past. Decisions about manufacturing are being made
during the design phase, and cost analysis is being considered
throughout the project cycle. A project leader (PL) for the
SMQll project was impressed with his team's ability to find
solutions to costing problems that would have been the
responsibility of some branch manager or supervisor in the old
organization.
We were working on a cost situation on converters, when I
communicated the fact back to the team that we had to
watch out for the dollars. We were running short on
funds. These guys went out, took a look at the cost, the
hours that somebody had estimated years ago to build these
things and said, "my gosh, they've got all these hours to
do this. It doesn't take that long and they don't have any
hours over here and this is where the time takes." And,
they actually work those issues out themselves. (#23)
In addition to allowing for alternative ideas, teams
were seen to provide a sense of a common goal and vision for
projects. This common goal served to unite the team members
and was seen as a cohesive force in the team. Team members
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were better able to visualize the total requirements of the
projects and work toward that common goal instead of being
concerned with the affect of their decisions on their
competency center.
We have common goals and visions and that is to get these
particular systems built and delivered, without running in
the hole - money wise, and to make the customer be
satisfied with that. And, when you share those common
goals, then the team seems to pull together and work
together toward those ends. (#23)
In those teams that had a common vision and were
experiencing improved problem-solving participation,
teambuilding was seen as the responsibility of all the members
of the project. No longer able to be concerned with only a
sub-component of a total project, team members are required to
work together on a more personal basis with their peers.
Functional walls between design, development, and
manufacturing were no longer in place to insulate one
specialist from another. To better communicate within the
teams, members were developing the skills to address intra-
team dynamics.
Some engineers need to sharpen their people skills. They
have a tendency to turn people off, and the rest of the
team, as a matter of fact. Its interesting to watch how
the team tries to compensate for somebody like that. As,
PL, at first, I was frustrated about, you know, I had to
solve this problem and smooth the water and the whole bit.
But, I found that other members of my team were able to
deal with these people from time to time. So, I've caught
myself recently kind of sitting back and waiting for them
to work this issue out. (#23)
An added benefit to the creation of project teams was
that the project teams were co-located. This co-location cut
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down on the communication barriers by placing team members
together instead of on the other side of the building. The
co-location also allowed for increased cross training between
the different functional experts on the team. The PL for the
TRSS project felt that co-location and cross training had
improved his team's performance.
We've had real good luck in that we've convince the people
who control the facilities here and in other areas control
people to allow our team, the whole team, to co-locate.
... It is no big secret that co-location works. You get
the whole team together, it improves everything, and we
are one of the first groups who have done that and we got
our buyers, contracts people, quality people all the
engineers, manufacturing schedulers, they are all sitting
in one friendly area. ... Cross training just exposes you
to all the other disciplines and what the other people
have to focus on. (#25)
2. As a result of teams within the competency centers
becoming more self-sufficient, competency center associates
are redefining their managerial roles.
While project teams draw on multiple disciplines to
accomplish one task (or several tasks related to one project),
competency centers have a different role. Competency centers
concentrate on four areas within a specific functional area or
specialty. First, competency centers are responsible for
ensuring that they can provide services or personnel to the
project teams. The services may 'nclude purchasing, equipment
testing, or fabrication. Personnel are retained in the
competency centers until a project requires their specific
talents (design, engineering, etc.). Second, competency
centers review and implement production processes to ensure
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that the best services are provided to project teams. Third,
they develop schedules for manufacturing workloads within
their functional area and monitor the workloads of personnel
who are assigned to project teams. Finally, the competency
center is charged with the responsibility for training and
career development of the personnel assigned to the competency
center.
Within the competency centers a reoccurring
explanation for successful teams was that the teams consists
of dynamic people. Teams were seen as having their own
positive aspects. The establishment of coaches assisted the
teams in working through internal group processes. The
ability of teams to take responsibility for their actions and
to make more decisions for themselves has freed up associates
to monitor and coordinate a broader range of activities. A
process improvement associate (PIA), in one of Beta's
competency centers, explained that teams that had been allowed
to make decisions and to take responsibility for their actions
were becoming more self-sufficient.
The biggest difference is that in the teams that are
taking the responsibility, they have the power to make
decisions now, where before if you had a branch manager,
a lot of times the branch manager would make a decision
and then relay that decision to the branch. ... There are
certain areas, even within our own organization, where
we're having a hard time letting go. But, in the areas
that we have let go, it seems that those people are the
ones that are participating more and taking more on their
shoulders and taking off and running with it. (#12)
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As a result of teams taking on more responsibility for
the decision making process, competency center associates are
able to redirect their efforts from one of supervision to one
of coordination.
A lot of the decision making is gone. Especially in my
case, because that team has really taken on a lot of those
responsibilities on themselves. Which is good, then I can
be off doing other things with other areas .. .The
decisions aren't there that used to be there. It's more
of, offer suggestions and take a look at different flows
and things, and offer suggestions with the various teams
and kind of do a coordination effort more than anything.
(#12)
To encourage the success of those teams taking on more
responsibility and therefore freeing up associates for new
roles, one Alpha PIA noted that he had changed his management
techniques to be more inclusive of team considerations. He
felt that his new management style made him more apart of the
team than the "boss."
I've tried harder to sell people on an idea, and convince
them that what I'm suggesting is the way we ought to go,
rather than saying, "Here's how we're going to do it,
because I'm the boss." And, I think the other thing is,
it's made me more aware to try to get the ideas of others.
(#11)
3. Team members feel like they can solve problems without
going through the hierarchy and that they have direct access
to individuals who can provide them with the necessary
information to perform their tasks.
The work group concept allows for team members to
address team problems by making use of the internal talents of
the team members. In the old organization, a request for
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outside assistance or training had to go up, across, and down
the organizational hierarchy, to obtain the needed resources.
With the new organization and the increased emphasis on
personnel development the teams are finding enhanced the
training opportunities within the team itself instead of
relying on the organizational hierarchy. A Beta master
scheduler (MS) describes the following:
We've got a lot of talent within our own areas as far as
training. What we're trying to do is put together a point
of contact to where if we've got one individual that is
the most talented on specific tasks, we're going to set up
a training seminar and have them run pretty much everybody
through what their task is to get them up to speed. ... One
thing we have done is within our organizations, we also
have what we call "grey beards." These are people that
have been here for years and years, know a little bit
about everything. So, if we've got an RE [reliability
engineer] and we're assigning him to a program and we're
expecting him to do reliability and quality issues, we're
going to say, "Hey, when you come to quality issues, go
see Fred. He's our grey beard." (#19)
Instead of having to communicate up and down
functional organizational lines, team members feel more
confident with their abilities to communicate directly with
the individuals necessary to complete their tasks. Within
Alpha, one PIA liked the new arrangement for communicating
within the organization.
I kind of like the fact that you can go talk to anybody
about anything. Because, before it was kill the
messenger. You could tell your branch manager something
you wanted to get to the division director, but it may
never get there and you would never know. (#05)
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A level one individual from Beta explained how
cooperation and direct access to other organizational members
has improved the quality of products at NAWC.
We had a defective slip ring from a new vendor we hadn't
worked with before. We had to determine how many were
defective, how many had to be shipped back, how many were
correct. I pulled together 5 of us, one person from
production, one from quality, inspection, and design.
... Under the old system, I would have gone to the other
branch chiefs before we got to he production level. Some
of them would have played power games. They would have
said, "we don't see it like that", or "we don't have time
to fix it, we have other important things to do." but, if
I can sit and talk to people, we will come to an
agreement. Previously I would have had to talk to my
boss. Now we hassle it out together. We had to
coordinate. Quality had parameters, production, had
parameters, design, etc. It's hard to coordinate, but if
we can sit and hassle it out, we come to an
agreement.(#60)
4. Team members see the bigger picture (or whole process)
instead of just their individual tasks.
The positive effects of the matrix organization can be
found by looking at the changes in the perceptions of the
individuals in regard to organizational processes and decision
making. In the old organization, a person's individual task
was seen as an end to itself. Now, individuals are beginning
to understand that their efforts most be coordinated with the
larger project for the NAWC to be successful.
Before a capacity center member only had to focus on
turning out a good part. Now he's being asked to not just
focus on his work but on the project as a whole, to be a
contact for the team, It doesn't do any good to be a
stellar individual performer when what we need is a
stellar team. It doesn't do any good to turn out 100
parts if someone else only turns out 1. (#06)
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This new perception of the interdependence of
individual tasks has been reinforced by NAWC's management by
allowing individuals to participate in decision making
activities that had traditionally been made by upper
management. Employee involvement in future budget
considerations and process improvement processes have fostered
a new feeling of "we were all pulling in the right direction,"
and a sense of being treated fairly in the decision making
process.
From a standpoint of what's going on upstairs. It was a
neat experience over the holidays we were working toward
executing direct work years based on our budget, the
amount of dollars we had in here. They put together a
whole bunch of leadership teams to look at future
marketing, to look at how do we execute, accelerate even,
the direct labor. How do we get props through faster, and
all this sort of thing. There was, all of a sudden I felt
this combined focus and it was as though all of a sudden
we were all pulling in the right direction again. (#23)
An important part of the coordination required is
provided by a new emphasis on the relationship between
individual projects and the larger organization's mission.
The following quote illustrates how using the corporate
mission provides guidance for decision making and a sense of
fairness about choices that are made.
But the level three people had budgeted a certain amount
of money to do these process improvement projects. ... We
developed a form, I forget who developed it, but everybody
wrote up the projects they'd like to see funded in this
PIP operation, and then we went through and rated them,
developed a series of things we thought gave it corporate
perspective that we could review all these by. And, so we
scored all the proposed projects, and then funded the
first eight or ten of them to get started early. And
thought that was a reasonable way to look like we weren't
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playing favorites and that sort of thing. We weren't just
picking people's pet projects because they knew somebody
or were friends with someone, or whatever. And, I think
that went pretty well, and I think that we all felt, I
happened to be on that steering committee, we felt that we
had gotten treated fairly in terms of the projects that we
had turned in ourselves. (#11)
5. NAWC's management is more process oriented instead of
functionally oriented.
While the budget is still a primary concern for NAWC,
the criteria for the allocation of resources (money and labor)
is tied more closely to processes that are required to
generate and complete projects. The typically bureaucratic
organization allocates resources to separate functional areas
based on a number of reasons (status, cost of operation, or
political clout). NAWC has made its organizational processes
the criteria for its decision making. This new process
orientation was described by the following three separate
levels within the organization, at the directorate level
(level three), by a PIA (level two), and by a PL (level one)
respectively.
We are much more prone today to ask about, what is our
process for getting there, to arrive at that decision.
But I think now we're much more process oriented and
data driven in the sense off getting not only the data but
then taking and analyzing that data, converting it into
information so we have some rational information to make
decisions, as opposed to a more knee-jerk or emotional
reaction. (#01)
It's through looking at processes and realizing what gets
the job done is people. And by removing layers of
bureaucracy it brings the people who need to work on a
problem to the problem a lot faster. ... The structure is
broad based enough that you can define it to meet the needs
of the project without the structure defining things for the
project. (#06)
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Level three's emphasis on process orientation has made
them more aware of the role of level one in identifying,
documenting, and correcting organizational processes.
We believe the level ones are the best ones to know how to
do that (documenting and correcting processes). So we had
face-to-face meetings with them and asked them to document
how they do business. Not how they think they do business,
but how they actually do business. (#15)
In the old organization, functional separation and
specialization resulted in disconnects between production
processes. Design engineers may not have been aware of
manufacturing limitations and technicians may not have been
aware of cost overruns or budget constraints. The emphasis on
organizational processes has improved the organization's
ability to identify and address problem areas which before
would have gone unnoticed. One project director specifically
had found that the ability to identify problems within a
process had improved.
Well the first thing that pops into mind is that in the
old organization when a problem existed, you didn't really
know about it for a long time. In the new organization
you hear about it almost immediately or you see it almost
immediately in terms of project execution especially. It
becomes very evident very quickly where there's going to
be a problem. (#22)
The concentration on process improvement has helped
the organization to better understand that production
processes consisted of internal customers. Internally, budget
process synchronization and a balance of power between the
project office and the competency centers have improved.
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Our budget processes were much more in sync. I think even
our budget processes last year for the '93 was much
smoother than it had ever been for us to get agreement and
come together doesn't mean everything's perfectly fine,
but overall I think much improved. We've wrestled with
process improvement things that we approve because we have
to look at those corporately and which ones get funded.
(#02)
What we want now is horizontal integration. Balance of
power. Project office, you can't survive without us, we
can't survive without you. We've got to work together.
And the number one given is, we're only here to satisfy
customers. Not to feed our mouths necessarily. If the
work dries up here, we'd better look at downsizing
manufacturing. Or design to development work goes down,
alpha's going to have to be flexible with their
downsizing. And with the world changing so fast, it's
more important that you have a flexible organization.
It's more important you understand your business, you have
a corporate focus, and you're able to adjust quickly to
the changing external environment. (#03)
Individuals accept that the best method for
understanding organizational processes has been to document
their own work processes to determine how they fit into the
overall project/organizational framework. The emphasis on
documenting processes was voiced by PIAs from Beta and Gamma.
I guess I was expecting more roadblocks, maybe not as much
cooperation. But, they (customer service teams) have been
extremely cooperative. They've put a lot of hard work
into the processes and the documentation of the processes,
offering suggestions where, in the past, it was they'd
come in, sit at your desk, and do your job. (#12)
We have a group that's material engineering scientists.
So we just let them formulate their own team. It's not a
recognized CST, if you will. And so what we did is, of
those entities, like the self-managed work teams
we.. .quite frankly they're probably light years ahead of
everybody else. They had their processes. Especially one
of them, they had their process documented. They
continually look at it and improve it. And they've
reduced their cycle time by 50%. (#15)
66
6. Teams are learning to work with others outside of
their own project team.
Project leaders were able to provide examples of
success stories in dealing with other teams within NAWC.
These examples pertained to a situation affecting an external
customer, interactions with other project leaders, and
interactions with competency centers. A PL for the SMQl1
project team cited an example of inter-team cooperation. In
receiving a call for assistance from a fleet user of printed
circuit boards, NAWC was able to coordinate with various
groups to provide urgent material to a ship prior to its
deployment.
The fleet support PL got a call and a ship was getting
ready to sail on Monday and they needed a printed circuit
board in order to get their system back up. Most of the
people that would be able to support us to provide that
had already left for the day, in manufacturing area
especially. So he immediately hung up the phone, got a
hold of me and asked what I could do. I went to my program
engineer who was just getting ready to leave. He went out
to the production floor, contacted one of the coaches that
was out there and they were able to get us one of the
printed circuit boards from one of the production units.
We then got that back to packaging with a special
request, got it packaged up. The next morning when I did
a follow-up, they were getting ready to ship it to arrive
Saturday afternoon. So the communication and coordination
that we had with a request coming from that team, that
PL, through my team, even when we had few people here is
an example that worked well. (#23)
Cooperation between project leaders was also seen to
be working. The constraints on manufacturing and personnel
resources were two examples where inter-project leader
cooperation had been successful.
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In fact, one of other PLs is building a lot of my hardware
along with his. So I have to talk with him constantly to
find out what the status hardware is on the floor. But
the floor doesn't recognize it as being my hardware. They
recognize it as being his. And we do that in order to
benefit from cost savings, scheduling. So yes, in that
sense. I may be unique in that situation, but I rely
heavily on two other PLs. (#20)
Now there are resources on my program who work 10, 20, 30,
40% of their time on my program and then they're
responsible to another project leader for some other % of
their time. And that hasn't created any difficulty for me
yet. What that means is I go negotiate with another PL if
all of a sudden my need jumped from a 10% requirement to
a 50% requirement. We negotiate that at the PL level.
And when we can agree on something we then tell the MS
[Master Schedule] that we've reached agreement and here's
how we're changing the commitment. ... You know, you give
up the resource cause you know it's going to happen to you
sometime. There are a few critical resources where I
couldn't afford to do that. ... .But for the most part, the
other PLs and I can negotiation it amongst ourselves.
(#20)
Another project leader cited a successful example of
inter-team cooperation with one of the competency centers
regarding a problem with a person who had been assigned to his
project from the competency center.
I responded back to the PDA [Personnel Development
Associate] and the MS that I was very unhappy with what
was going on and they immediately wanted to sit down and
have a meeting with the CCD [Competency Center Director],
which we did. And the CCD, which was in alpha, had looked
into the particular problem and when I walked in I was
quite impressed. I mean he had an agenda of steps that he
wanted to go through and follow and see if we couldn't
resolve the problem. Got this particular young individual
to realize that they didn't have to do it all themselves,
they could get somebody else to help them. So that
interchange with that CC was very good. (#23)
Inter-team cooperation within the competency centers
was seen in a positive light. Experiencing a problem with
workload distribution in one competency center, one PIA in
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Beta had seen personnel from another team assist in sharing
the work tasks. This cooperation was accomplished at the team
level instead of having to be routed through the old
organization hierarchy.
Another good indication is the personnel moves. A
shortage occurred somewhere and if we're getting
overloaded in packaging, let's say, the packaging team
will approach another team, say, "I'm overloaded,
overworked at this point. Would you guys be able to
provide some support over here?" (#12)
An important aspect of inter-team cooperation was that
it could be initiated by an individual team member. An Alpha
master scheduler was approached by an individual on a project
team about being transferred. Because of the flexibility of
competency centers and project teams to handle personnel
problems and to interact effectively, the master scheduler was
able to get the cooperation of the personnel development
associate and project leader in address the individual's
problem.
I had a fellow come to me who was saying that he wasn't
too happy with what job he was working on, as an example.
And it didn't appear that the PL was too happy with what
he was doing. So there wasn't a good match there any
longer. So the issue there as far as I was concerned was
we needed to find a different job for him or we had to at
least straighten out what the situation is. So naturally
I'd get the PDA involved because it has to do with a
person's development. ... .First I was talking to the
individual by himself. Then I got our PDA involved. We
talked about it. After that our PDA and I went to our
director to make sure he was involved with what was
happening and all of us worked the issue. ... the PL was
brought in within the week and started working the issue
and it turned out that we released that person from the
project that was supporting him because thing's were not
working out. (#16)
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7. Members of the LTD (Level Three Directors) are
committed to finding ways for the AGO and Command Staff to
work together.
Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and Project Office (AGO) were
established in April of 1992. The Command Staff organization
was not implemented until January of 1993. The distinction
between the AGO and Command Staff followed the traditional
lines of operations (production) and support (comptroller,
personnel office, graphics support, etc.). As the emphasis on
organizational processes and team development have grown,
level three has become more aware of the necessity to tear
down the walls separating the AGO and Command Staff. While
they have not been completely successful in replacing the two
groups of AGO Directors and Command Staff Directors with a
single group of Level Three Directors (LTD), they did provide
a positive example of inter-team dynamics by demonstrating a
new awareness for the importance of the AGO and the Command
Staff to work more closely together.
At level three, I think we have a lot of work to do. As
I started off this meeting saying, I think it's a mistake
for us still to be talking about AGO and command staff or
"six pack" or whatever you to call us. We should be
calling ourselves the LTD, the Level Three Directors.
Because as long as we talk about command staff and AGO,
you're talking about the operations and the support
functions. And you're not moving as one team. And, we
really need to break down that barrier. That's
historically probably every organization that's ever stood
up within the Department of Defense. You have those
operations people and then you have the support people,
those indirect people that are over there just sucking up
all that money. What do they do anyway? We've come a
long way from where we were 2 years ago. We still need to
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break down that barrier of calling command staff and AGO.
(#02)
8. Corporate information is being disseminated adequately
from level three to level two to level one.
One of the most significant positive inter-team
interactions was the downward flow of corporate information
(information concerning personnel reductions, base closure,
etc.). A major concern of the level three personnel
interviewed was whether information was being received at the
lower levels. Various approaches by upper management had been
initiated to improve the downward flow of communication.
Appendix F contains a Communication Matrix for NAWC. The
speed of disseminating corporate information from the upper
levels of management to the lower levels had improved since
the reorganization.
One of the strengths that I saw coming out was the
communications we needed and actually getting the word
down from Bob Barnett [Executive Director] to the level
ones within the same week. (#21)
Roundtable meetings were established to facilitate the
flow of information between level three and level one. These
meeting are held by level three directors and randomly
selected level two and level one personnel are invited to
attend. These meetings are an open forum type of presentation
with the level three person providing some basic information
and allowing for questions from the personnel attending the
meeting. While they have not been held as frequently as
promised, they have provided an opportunity for level two and
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one personnel to interact with level three managers. A level
three manager comments on the results:
In the roundtables it's apparent that some of the messages
are getting through pretty well, because like I said I had
1 or 2 folks in the last few sessions to say that
communications are much better. And, there aren't nearly
as many questions about things that I'm sure that I
communicated to the CCDs and that I was expecting them to
communicate to the other folks. (#04)
Competency center meetings are the primary arena for
the distribution of corporate information. Since everyone is
assigned to a competency center (with the exception of the
project director and project area leaders), the competency
centers are held responsible for ensuring that information is
disseminated. There have been some problems with arranging
for all personnel in a competency center to attend meeting
(sizes can be as high as 120 people), but the general
consensus is that the competency center meetings have been
beneficial.
I know since we have established the communications
meetings it has been a real handy meeting to add riders to
what is going on in level one. (#21)
Well, I think its working better than it was in April,
because we didn't have any communication lines other than
one on one, if we happened to see somebody or if they had
a question and come to us. At least once a month, we're
sitting down with an open discussion type atmosphere. I
don't know if that's enough or not. We've asked the
people in our small groups, "Do you think this is
working?" Most of them say it is. (#19)
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C. CHALLENGES STILL FACING NAWC
1. Many teams are struggling with learning how to work
together as a team.
This is particular true within the customer service
teams (CSTs) at level one, where there is less experience, not
much guidance, and little or no project focus. The lack of a
consistent organization and identifiable points of contact
within the CSTs has contributed to the frustration felt by
project teams and competency centers. The primary focus of
team development within NAWC has been on the project teams.
More recently, the competency centers and customer service
teams are establishing self-managed teams in their respective
areas. The teams in general were all positive about the role
of teams in the new organization. However, the following
provides some shortcomings in team development that were
identified in the interviews. This section is organized by
the themes that were identified within each of the
directorates. However, some of the issues were found to exist
in more than one directorate.
a. Project Teams
While the project leaders (PL) were positive about
their own empowerment, they felt that there were limits to the
amount of empowerment that should be given to team members.
The TRSS PL felt there was a proablem with the credibility of
NAWC's leadership because no "credible standards" had been
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established for team members. This guidance or standard could
be used to direct the actions of the team members.
The dilemma is if I ran a destroyer and I empowered
everyone to do whatever they thought was right. Where
would that ship go and what would it do? And, that is
what I think we have here, everyone is empowered. But,
there is no real credible leadership, there is no credible
standard that one could gather around and say that this is
my purpose in life. ... Yeah, you go say why can't I get
this done. They say, well those guys are empowered. They
can do whatever they think is right. If I tell them myjob is right and the next guy, who may be legitimate,
tells them his job is the right one to be working on, who
calls that then, who calls the difference? (#25)
Another PL was concerned that there was not a
feedback loop between project teams for lessons learned. This
was seen to limit the ability of teams to benefit from the
mistakes of other teams. In light of the possible temporary
nature of project team life cycles it could doom the teams to
repeating the same mistakes since there was not an established
mechanism for sharing team successes.
We have talked and talked and talked over the past few
years about lessons learned, but I have never seen anyone
really close the loop and publish what they learned. You
know they share it amongst their team, but don't publish
it so everyone else can benefit from it. (#20)
b. Alpha Directorate
Within the Alpha Directorate problems were
identified relating to team development. A level one
individual stated that team members have to become more
accepting of responsibility. Team members have to be willing
to share accountability for their decisions.
Until they (teams) get to the place where they pick up and
can make the decisions themselves, the amount of authority
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they have depends on how they accept it and how they use
it. And, as they begin to learn how to accept and use
authority, then there's more authority that comes down.
(#34)
Discipline within the team was seen as a problem by
one alpha respondent, because of peer relationships. The
daily face-to-face working relationships made team members
uncomfortable with confronting poor or badly performing
members.
And, I think as a team, we've come to recognize that there
are things that we don't want to make a decision on like
internal discipline. ... But, when you have twelve people
that you work with everyday and you say, "Wait here, Bob.
You're way out of line and you're going to have to do this
or we're going to have to take it up a higher step." And,
then that creates hard feelings and you have to work with
this person everyday. So we would rather that the, those
kinds of decisions or actions be taken by someone up
above. (#34)
Another individual within Alpha felt that the teams
had not learned the mental tasks of consensus management and
self-managed teams, because no training had been provided to
the teams prior to the reorganization. This lack of team
skills has resulted in a reliance on old standard procedures.
Yeah, they need to get people to learn to do mental tasks
that are consensus type, self-managed. They need to
develop the mental skills that are working on self-managed
teams, and right now it's just been given to me, and said
you are a self-managed work team, you go and do your work.
Nobody's told them what that means. Nobody told them how
they should be managing themselves. What does it mean to
be self-managing? ..... We're at the stage of running the
sidewalks the way the architect wants them to look pretty
and building fences around them so people don't wonder off
onto the grass. ... people are realizing that the
sidewalks don't take them where they want to go, but
haven't figured out how to jump over the fence and run
across the grass. (#31)
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A stigma of being assigned to the CC (verses being
on a project team) was identified during two of the
interviews. This stigma has a negative impact on the team
development within the competency center. If individuals are
more concerned with getting out of the competency center than
improving it, their efforts will be directed toward finding a
new project team. This decreases their identification with
the competency center and thei: loyalty to it. A project
member from Alpha directorate stated:
And, something that I talked about that I'd forgotten
until now, there is a stigma attached to being in a
competency center and not assigned to a project. And, I
think that part of that stigma could have been avoided or
made less of a stigma if when they did the reorganization,
those people that didn't fit, hadn't been put in there.
No matter whether they had been managers before or not.
If they had been a manager before, they found something
for them, rather than putting them in the competency
center. (#35)
c. Beta Directorate
Beta's primary mission is to provide logistic and
manufacturing support for project teams. Few of Beta's
personnel are actually assigned to project teams. Alpha
provides the bulk of personnel to project teams, because of
its design and engineering specialties. Gamma concentrates on
quality assurance, envirnomental testing and fleet support.
As a result of the different functional areas, Alpha and Gamma
have the benefit of seeing the development and usage (by fleet
personnel) of a project. Beta, on the other hand, is still
focusing on productivity levels within their competency
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centers. The employees operate as members of teams referred
to as capacity teams, because they provide manufacturing
support to multiple projects rather than being individually
assigned to a specific project.
Beta provided contrasting views between
respondents. Three of the interviewees were in customer
service teams(CSTs) and four were Area Process Coordinators
(APC). The APCs are project team members (from Beta) whose
job it is to coordinate project work within the Beta
competency centers. Different perspectives were provided by
these individuals.
While the CST members were positive about their
teams, they did state that some of the level two associates
were still acting like "bosses" and not willing to let the
teams go on their own. A contributing factor for some of the
associate's over involvement was the excess number of
competency center managers. The CST members criticized the
competency centers for being top heavy. They felt the reason
for the competency centers being top heavy was that room had
to be made for the old supervisors in the new organization.
Personally, I think the management is too heavy in here.
It's too much management. Now that they've changed things
around there's no supervisors except for the heads of the
departments. ... I don't know what they did with all the
engineers that are still here. I just think they made
them PDAs and PIAs. ... I think they're heavy there too.
Why do we need four PIAs in our group? We get two PDAs.
Why do we need two? (#40)
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Despite the CST member's concerns over the
intervention of "bosses" in their teams, they identified
negative aspects of the self-managed team concept. As with
Alpha, personnel discipline was seen as hard for the teams to
address, because of the peer relationship.
Discipline's one. We cannot handle any discipline right
now. If we know somebody's doing something, all we can do
is tell them about it, as far as a group coming up.
Because others may be doing the same thing, and we're not
catching that. Everybody gets real defensive. So, that's
kind of a bad item, and we haven't worked around that yet.
I don't know if we ever will as a team. It's kind of
tough, equal members disciplining other equal members.
(#37)
Concern was voiced by two respondents that they
were being asked to accept more responsibility and capability
without any additional pay. They perceived the reorganization
as means of extracting more work for the same wages. The lack
of monetary reward was seen as an impediment to accepting
greater (or broader) responsibilities. This concern was only
mentioned by Beta personnel. A reason for this may be past
emphasis on capacity production. Since these individuals have
always been judged by their individual performance, and little
training has been provided to them on the function of self-
managed teams, it is not a surprise that team development is
seen as an addition of tasks and not a redefinition of their
job descriptions.
Well, they don't have any openings for people to come from
the outside. They haven't posted any new positions. They
haven't come up with any new positions. So, I think what
they want to do is cross-training where they can detail
people in different areas. In other words, have people
78
wear more hats, take on more tasks. Be responsible for
more. ... A lot of people are going to reject the idea
given more responsibilities without any monetary, like
getting any more pay for it. ... 'cause I've seen
rejection already to that. Not rejection, but people kind
of bitter about it. Why should they do more and not get
paid for it? (#40)
Right now, it's mainly the cutting back. And, they say
they're going to redo everybody's job, basically,
incorporate more layoff people and incorporate you to do
more work without promotions. ... Maybe they might want me
over here for three weeks and they could work it so,
you're going to do this, even though it might be an
engineering job. Therefore, they have given me no
promotion or anything, but I'm still going to be doing an
upper level job. (#37)
Beta members viewed team processes as frustrating
and stressful. While wanting the authority to make decisions,
they tend to look for leadership from managers in addressing
group issues. Active participation in group processes is not
seen to provide good solutions, but increases the level of
group conflict.
It's frustrating. We designed this conveyer system to go
up and down the aisles. We put this bracket in along the
floor. We had it figured out that it was a three stage
process, there would be no down time. The machine repair
people had all kinds of trouble with it because they
thought there'd be electricity along the ground. They
complained to the PIA associate and he said that we had to
come up with a compromise. We had this -meeting. It was
very frustrating. This problem had been there for three
years. I could have just done it and gotten it over with.
They wanted the bracket on the other side. One of them
said that they'd even make it. Three years ago they would
have said, "We don't do design work." but, if they're
motivated, they'll do it. They're motivated now because
they don't want to step over the bracket. So they
designed the bracket. I know those guys. In the old
organization he wouldn't do anything. He'd do a drawing
even if he knew it was wrong. It seemed like just another
delay, but at least we have a compromise. The only thing
I deal with now is ideas. I have no other currency, no
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authority. The large group is difficult because there's
usually someone against the ideas.
The Area Process Coordinators (APCs) were more
negative about the success of intra-team process within Beta.
They felt that the competency centers were still possessive
of their processes and were not flexible enough to change when
required. The competency centers did not have a global view
of their work and as a result were not as cooperative as they
could be. Three of the four APC discussed the limited
perspective of the CSTs.
For instance in MDA (Mechanical Devices and Assembly),
they think, "we know how to handle our business the best
so we'll just launch out and do it. And, we won't be
accountable to you until we've been proven to be wrong."
For example, we've gone out to CCs to voice a concern and
you get the feeling they're saying, "Don't come to us with
this now, until the problem is actually there, then we'll
take care of it." I don't think they're very proactive.
They're still reactive. They will talk to you and address
a problem once it's occurred, but they won't make plans
that are proactive that can prevent it from happening to
start with. (#39/1)
We're running a program. And like MDA, they think parts
are parts and they don't care about the program and the
whole like we do. And, that's the new organization,
that's what I don't like about it. In the old
organization, we had control over our part from the day
they came in until they shipped out. We've lost a lot of
that control. (#39/2)
While we're looking at a global view of the program, a lot
of times they're looking at an isolated piece of it and
only worrying about that little isolated piece of it.
(#39/3)
Technically, the APC criticized the competency
centers for not being good at planning and meeting work
schedules, and for not being able to accurately account for
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costs. The APCs did acknowledge that a cause of the CST's
problems was that team training for the CSTs was two years
behind the project teams.
One problem I see, the concept I believe in, I've had some
outside training in these areas so maybe its easier for me
to buy into it. As each of us got more training and
became more aware about what was happening I think our buy
in increased. But, this training is sort of trickling
down. And, I don't think the training that's needed or
the explanation to the people actually doing the work has
actually filtered down that far yet. And once you've got
the concept you've got to go through the growing phases of
sub-grouping; storming, forming... and hopefully you get to
some degree of synergism and hopefully you're doing good
work. Well at higher levels maybe its happened, and then
it comes down a level and they start at square one and
maybe it happens for them, and then it comes down another
level and they start at square one.. .Whereas it would have
been better if we could have all started off and maybe we
would have already progressed through these stages. But,
we have some people in the plant who haven't even started
forming. I think the forming stage is just beginning at
the worker level. (#39/3)
There's a 1 1/2 or 2 years difference in opinions about
how things should be working. According to the project
office, given how long they've been working on this it
should be working like clockwork by now and some of these
people are just now forming teams, they're just beginning.
(#39/4)
d. Gamma Directorate
While teams were just starting to develop in Gamma,
one respondent felt similar to the Beta CST members that some
managers had not let go of the old ways of managing. The
overshadowing of the teams by old supervisors was seen to be
stifling team development. In discussing self-management, one
individual commented:
When that [self-management] happens that will be good.
But, we're not being turned loose as teams yet. Right now
I'm seeing the same "no we're not going to do that." I
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love it when they say, "sonny, we've done that for 20
years and you're telling me it was wrong?" And, I say,
"no sir, I'm not telling you it's wrong, I'm just saying
this is better." If they turn us loose and they mean it,
it will be better. If they just bless us and say we're a
team and still stifle creativity, it's the same old stuff
with a different name. (#42)
Another respondent felt that the directions from
associates in one CC were considered vague and resulted in
wasted effort. The problem was that the associates were not
specific enough with their directions. This required the team
members to produce large amounts of data that were not
acceptable or only partially utilized by the associates.
I know some of the feelings within our group, as far as
level two is concerned, people just want to be left alone
to do their job and now they're getting tasked with a lot
of the management reports and things like that, that they
really don't.. .They're getting really bogged down with
these things. ... We personally have gone through some
recent scares and report issues between us and Crane in
terms of their environmental test capabilities; comparing
facilities. ... But, I know a lot of that information got
condensed down, some of it even was dropped out of the
final thing. so, we had people pulling fire drills here
that basically, the stuff was dropped. ... Yes, it was just
kind of this vague thing; we're going to get everything
and anything that we can and we'll do whatever we have to
from there. (#43)
2. Competency centers and project leaders are having
trouble interacting effectively.
The reorganization established four directorates
(excluding the Command Staff). The role of the Alpha, Beta,
and Gamma directorates is to provide personnel, technical, and
manufacturing support to the Project Office directorate. In
NAWC's matrix structure, personnel are pulled from the
competency centers to work on specific projects. These teams
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remain in existence for the life of the project. Upon
completion or termination of the project, the personnel are
returned to the competency centers to be made available for
other projects. The role of the team members is provide
technical expertise to the project and to liaison with the
Customer Service Teams (CSTs) for additional support (ex.,
manufacturing, environmental testing, etc.). This matrix
organization requires that project teams and competency
centers interact on a continuous basis to obtain needed
personnel, material, technical, and manufacturing support to
successfully complete project goals.
This interaction has been a struggle for many
individuals. Conflict has arisen over the perception that
unnecessary work is created by the CCs, process
inconsistencies in the CSTs, a lack of ownership for process
improvement, indirect funding, and competition for resources.
a. Project Leaders feel that Competency Centers cause
Project Leaders unnecessary work
The project office felt that any new program or
process review by the CC seemed to increase the workload of
the project office/teams. The PAL (Project Area Leader) felt
that information requested by the CC was overburdening the
project office.
Now that these CCs and PDAs, PIAs, CCDs, plus all of the
action teams that are supposed to be looking at some of
our more systemic problems, every time we turn around
they're asking us for information because, quote, unquote,
they don't know. OK, so now these PLs are inundated with
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requirements with "what is your plan, how many people in
my CC are you going to use, when are you going to use
them?" It becomes a data nightmare to some extent because
now all those new needs for information are focused on the
PLs and PALs. (#18)
b. Process inconsistency in the CSTs
Some project leaders who were interviewed were also
critical of the customer service teams in the competency
centers and their inability to provide consistent, clear
procedures for the CSTs. This inconsistency was viewed as
negatively affecting the project teams. Since the project
teams need to obtain services from the CSTs, they were
frustrated by the constantly changing rules and procedures for
requesting those services. CST process changes slowed down
the project schedule and required project teams to learn new
procedures and to resubmit requests for the same services that
had previously been provided. In addition to the frustration
over inconsistent process requirements, the lack of an
identifiable point of contact on CSTs was seen as a problem
for project teams. The project teams were unable to
consistently talk to the same person within the CSTs to obtain
current directions or to resolve existing problems.
one is the proposal process. I think it's a necessary
thing, but I think the way we're implementing it, it's not
the most efficient. To put the prop together for last
year we had to have each individual put together their own
green sheet and then a supplementary list of tasks of what
they were going to do. It was time consuming to
coordinate all that because I have 18-20 folks, with all
the different CCs represented, you have deal with the MSs
from each one, each one had a little bit different
requirement as to what he wanted to see. (#7)
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Absolutely, you have to relearn how to do it every time
you do it. To a production house, that will kill you.
You have to know that if I do this design this way that
the printed wiring board people can get me boards back
instantly or if I request material this way that the
supply folks would assign it to the buyer and the buyer
would buy it and follow up on the purchases and I will
have the material. Well, it is not working. (#25)
c. Lack of ownership for process improvement
The project office voiced concern that some of the
competency centers were not taking ownership for their
processes. This lack of ownership negatively affected the
projects because of the need for project teams to obtain
services from the competency centers. The project teams have
no control over the processes within the competency centers.
They felt that if the associates within the competency centers
would take greater ownership for their process, the problems
of inconsistent procedures, and poor service would be
eliminated. A PAL echoed the concern for a lack of ownership
for production and organizational processes in some of Beta's
competency centers.
There should have been PDAs, PIAs, CCDs who were somehow
motivated to deal with this issue rather than my having to
get involved in it. What I'm finding is that if there is
any downside to the reorganization, it is that with the
way its been implemented, there no longer is a feeling of
ownership of a lot of these processes .. And, as a result
of that, they're not, in my view, they're not as
motivated, if you will, to go out and confront some of
these issues. (#18)
The issue of lack of initiative and ownership on the part of
the competency centers and CSTs was also perceived by project
leaders.
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We invited her to come to the meeting to talk about a
problem we were having with terminals--installing
terminals on boards. And she had some info at that
meeting. But they had never measured their process. So
I was asking some questions about how they were planning
to go about doing this, was there anything we could do. We
could help run a test case or something. Well I was
disappointed because then last week she didn't show up.
(#23)
Beta competency centers were noted the most often
by the respondents as the directorate with which they were the
most unhappy. Since Beta's primary responsibility is for
logistics support and manufacturing support, they are
primarily capacity operated CSTs. This means that the CSTs
are given a continuous batch of jobs to perform for the entire
organization (ex., ordering material requirements, or
operating a drill press). These functions are repetitive and
are not cost effective to be given over to the project teams.
As a result, the focus of the CST has remained on individual
productivity. Concentration on individual productivity
coupled with organizational attention on project teams has
hindered the development of self-managed team skills within
the CSTs. The problem as identified by the project office is
that these CSTs are more concerned with their own functions
than the success of the project.
You've got the project office here, and the competency
centers here. Our concept of operations says that you
have the project team here. And, you have this support
leg coming from the competency centers and the project
office. Their jobs are to support this project team so
that they get it done. In Alpha and Gamma, what you would
see is, say 90 per cent of the people would stand up and
say, yeah that's the way it is supposed to work. In Beta,
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what you see is I have this wall here from the project
team to the CST.(#22)
Because of the project teams' direct contact with
the project sponsor (or external customer), the project office
feels a great sense of pressure to complete the project on
time and on budget. A project area leader (PAL) felt that the
competency center's apathy in accepting ownership of their
processes was due in part to a lack of appreciation on the
part of the competency centers regarding the pressures on the
project office.
There's been a significant increase in day-to-day
operations of the project office like this. Its up to us,
we're the ones who seemingly have the ownership of the
program and who care about what happens today and what
happens tomorrow, and are things running smoothly. We're
the ones going out and finding these barriers. Then it's
a question of well, "who can we draw in to fix this?"
And, one of the byproducts of the reorganization is that
I find myself working across the board at a level to solve
some of the day-to-day problems that I previously, as a
program manager, would never have gotten involved in.
Only because we have to be successful. If no one else is
gong to deal with it, ultimately we do. Because we're the
ones who answer to the sponsors for the results. (#18)
d. Direct verses indirect funding
As with any manufacturing organization, labor cost
must be accounted for using direct and indirect funding
procedures. NAWC's project teams have become more aware of
the financial constraints confronting the organization. Since
direct funds determine how many and which personnel with be
employed, the products of the project teams provide the
financial blood of the organization. A problem has developed
because the competency centers, which are responsible for
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improving manufacturing processes and for purchasing new
equipment, are funded with indirect funds. This awareness has
lead to conflict regarding the use of project funds to support
indirect activities. Competency centers are trying to obtain
as much funding to support process improvement, while the
project teams, who have to answer to the project sponsor for
cost data, are trying to keep costs as low as possible. This
conflict has resulted in very negative feelings about the
extent that competency center personnel will go to charge
indirect costs to project team direct funds.
Everyone who is indirect is getting a lot of indirect
pressure to burn your overhead or "burn out." I don't
know what phrase your familiar with. They are getting a
lot of pressure to do what ever they can and you can read
this anyway you want. To get off indirect you get on a
direct job order, direct funded job order like the TRSS
program. And, TRSS is a big target because we've got
millions and millions of dollars and we got 500 different
job orders so a guy can make a mistake on his labor card
and probably hit a TRSS job order. One area went as far
as to post all the TRSS job orders up in their area and
told the people before you charge indirect, you hit one of
these job orders, that is illegal. So we went back and
pulled it down, but they put it out on plant mail anyway
back to the group. (#25)
One of the conflicts I suddenly find myself in, I find
myself kind of strong on, is essentially, what this boils
down to, is being a spy. Although they didn't use that
word, but it all boils down to being a spy, to figure out
what the funding status was. ... .They have their people to
employ. They have their,.. they need so many man hours to
keep the people in the competency center paychecks coming.
They want to reach in and grab as much work as they can.
(#13)
e. Competition for resources
Not only has the issue of indirect funding been a
cause for conflict between the project teams and competency
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centers, a competition for existing organizational resources
also exists between the competency centers and the project
teams. The competency centers have been tasked with process
improvements and supporting the projects. But, the cost of
that has not recognized by the project teams.
I think they do think that indirect is not very important.
And, I think that probably stems from the fact that,
naturally, we want to get everybody off of indirect and
put them on direct, as much as we can. However, even if
we were fully loaded and everybody was on direct, and so
forth, we still have to improve these things. (#16)
The need to improve production processes and
support project teams combined with scarce organizational
resources has created competition between the project teams
and the competency centers.
Computers are a big tool here as far as helping us
communicate and helping us do our work. The organization
because of budget cuts basically doesn't have indirect
money to buy those, some project teams are fairly wealthy
and they can buy that kind of stuff for their people and
that creates a problem with some of our people as far as
some feel inferior they don't get the same access. (#13)
People typically on project teams are assigned direct
work. The things we're working on are more or less
indirect that support those direct line processes. But,
we're competing for the same resources and it makes our
job a little bit hard because we don't have the people
that are familiar enough, or take the initiative, or who
can follow our way..... .The Project Office feels that some
of the processes we're working on are things they don't
need to be aware of, because they're only results driven.
But, I think they do need to be aware because we do
something that significantly reduces the turnaround time
on that product. (#5)
In summary, consistently, the greatest amount of
conflict was between the project teams and the CSTs. The
areas of conflict involved the issue of constantly changing
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procedures, funding issues, and resource competition. The
leading cause of conflict with the CSTs was seen as the
inconsistent organizational processes and procedures within
the CSTs. Because each CST was developing its own processes
at its own rate, project teams were confused about how they
were supposed to interact with the CST. This confusion
created waste in learning the new processes and waste in
redoing old processes that had been changed by the CSTs (e.g.,
proposals). The issue of direct and indirect funding was the
most visible conflict measure. There seemed to be no
corporate justification or consistent policy in managing
overhead charges. If a policy does exist, the project teams
were not aware of it or were not accepting it. The projects
were very concerned with how these indirect cost were
effecting their projects. The competency center managers were
seen as inappropriately using direct funding to cover their
own position and the excess capacity in the competency center.
Comments were even made by competency center members that the
competency centers were top heavy with indirect management.
The competency centers did feel that they were in competition
with the project teams for hardware and personnel resources.
Since the tasks of improving the equipment and processes did
not receive direct funding, the better corporate equipment and
personnel were on project teams. This conflict has made
process improvement secondary to the project team's objectives
of project completion on time and on budget.
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3. NAWC is readjusting its formal flow of communication
to adapt to the new organization.
NAWC has changed from a traditional bureaucratic
organization to a matrix structure using self-managed teams.
In its old structure, NAWC's lines of communications were
typical ot most organizations. Communication traveled
primarily along the organizational structure. Information
being passed downward from upper management was distributed
via the functional area managers or department heads. The
same is true for information coming from the lower levels in
the organization. A person would pass the information along
to his supervisor, who in turn would pass it along to a
manager until the information was received at the appropriate
level. For information to travel between functional areas,
the official route was for a worker to refer the information
or request to his supervisor, who in turn would pass it along
to the next level supervisor until a comparable level
supervisor could be reached in the other functional area. The
information would then be passed downward to the appropriate
person in that functional area.
By eliminating their bureaucratic structure, NAWC was
no longer able to pass information along the old communication
network. With the new matrix structure, where temporary
(short and long term) projects exists, horizontal
communication has taken on a more significant role. Three
challenges with NAWC's new communication network were
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identified in the interviews. They pertain to concern for
removal of the organizational structure, the types of
information flow, and the responsibilities for corporate
information flow.
a. Concern with lack of hierarchial organizational
structure
Both level three and level two respondents utilized
assumptions about organizational structure to formulate their
opinions of NAWC's communication effectiveness. Level three
made reference that the removal of line supervisors had
changed, if not reduced the quality communication flow to
employees.
There was a significanL gap in commuri.cation because we
had taken away the first line supervisor.(#10)
There used to be this line manager, that had anywhere from
8 to 20 people working for him. And he provided a lot of
different personalized input. Now some have 120, 200 it's
very difficult for them to provide that level of personal
communication.(#10)
Level two interviewees were also concerned with the effect of
the new structure on communication.
There's no direct pathways to anybody. There's no
structure for the communications between people. So
things that used to have a path of being communicated is
just filtering through the system, not necessarily
organized. (#S)
Level Three felt that this lack of structure was seen to be
causing problems for the level ones.
The biggest problem right now is that level ones are going
to wherever they have to get the information they want.
The official way is they come to the CC. People have been
thrown into CCs with administrative people that they may
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or may not know and may not feel comfortable going to
those people for that type of information. (#5)
The effect of structure on the communication
process was not shared by everyone. A level three and level
two respondent did comment, that while the structure was
different, it did not necessarily relate to quality.
So I'm not saying it's bad. I'm just saying that's what
makes it different about communications. So, I don't
think a lot of us have figured out quite how to do
that ..... we can't depend on the organizational
pyramid.(#4)
My personal feeling as far as our particular CC is
concerned, I think the communications between Level Two
and Level One has been good. I base that on, we ask that
question continually of our people, what they think, and
they seem to be happy ..... And like I said we pass the
information back and forth or ask them to get with the
PDA, depending on what the situation is, or the PIA. I
think in general people know who to go to for specific
questions they might have or specific issues they might
have. (#16)
b. Types of organizational information/flow
The main concern of the level three respondents was
that corporate information (downsizing, reductions in force,
personnel issues, and organizational wide information) was not
flowing downward in the organization. The concern was with
whether the employees were receiving and accepting the
information from the executive level and level three.
The organization isn't working the way it should be
working after three years. And, we're not getting
information down to the Level One people.(#10)
Not nearly enough time is spent communicating directly
to Level One.(#4)
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Concern with level three's preoccupation with
downward communication was expressed by two of the level three
respondents. They felt that the concentration on downward
communication did not align with the goals of the new
organization. The organization was restructured to include
more people into the decision making processes. The goal of
communication, as viewed by these individuals, was to expedite
the flow of information from level one to levels two and
three. The continuing focus on downward communication was
seen as a carry over from the old organization and was having
a negative impact on productivity. If the communication
network was working overtime to move corporate information
downward, it would not be able to convey process information
upward.
I think the same thing happened on the other end, that
communications coming from Level One to Level Three have
broken down somewhat, or are not at the level required to
make this organization work.(#10)
And I still think we have a paradigm here that we're
talking about getting stuff down to people. And yet we
say our concept of operations is the inverted pyramid. I
don't really see that in communication because I don't see
that many Level Ones really involved. For them to
communicate, they have to be involved in the teams that
are deciding how we do some things here at the center. So
they still haven't seen this inverted from their
standpoint, because they've never been asked to be part of
the communications flow the other way ...... Getting it
back up is really going to require a kind of a change
within the people.(#2)
Three of the level two respondents also felt that
upwards communications from level one personnel were lacking.
They were concerned that they (level two) was not getting
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enough feedback about the corporate information that had been
passed down to level one, and that level one was not
contributing to the reorganization by providing process input
(unless questioned by higher levels).
I don't, in all honesty, get a whole lot of information
coming up. (#13)
To be honest with you though the communications back from
Level Ones to us hasn't been outstanding. They've always
asked a lot of questions about what we're presenting and
stuff like that, but we don't normally get a lot of
feedback about what's bothering them. (#16)
But you know what kind of bothers me, and this is the
technical kind of thing. If you look at it they talk
about flow down from Level Three to Level Two to Level
One. That's the standard. ... .They've flipped into their
paradigm and gone right back into the hierarchy flowing 3,
2, 1. There's mixed messages. (#15)
Overall, levels one and two were satisfied with the
corporate information that was being passed down the formal
communication channels. However, some of the respondents were
concerned that the number of communication meetings outweighed
the information.
It doesn't work because every meeting turns out to be not
so useful, no new information is shared. People start
skipping the meetings and not caring about the meetings.
If it's once a month, there's new information to talk
about. (#8)
You know, the only thing is sometimes it (weekly
communication meeting) is probably too often. There's not
a whole lot of new information. (#44)
Similar to the concerns voiced by the level three
managers, regarding too much emphasis on the downward flow of
corporate information, level one respondents did voice some
concern over level three's lack of ability to communicate
9S
about production processes or work activities. Upper level
managers are seen as isolated and out of touch with the actual
processes taking place at level one.
It makes life a lot more simple for us that they don't get
involved, if you want to consider it monkeying around in
the program. But on the other hand, they've gotten
themselves isolated enough to the point where they don't
know what's going on, and what's really driving things
down at the working level. Even though we have fewer
levels in management now, I think they're more isolated
now than before we reorganized. (#35)
I really couldn't tell you much about level three, because
I never see them enough. But, they're supposed to come
out and see how we work in our areas a lot of times, and
every time they end up talking to the director or the
competency center director, and they never do make it out
into the areas and see what we really do. ... I wouldn't
say it's recognition, I'd say they don't know what's going
on. They have an idea. If you would ever listen to some
of these tours going around, and some of the things that
they're saying about certain jobs, it's kind of laughable.
I have to kind of walk off, because they really are just
B.S.ing a lot of the way through because they don't
understand what it all is. (#37)
c. Corporate information responsibilities
An interesting side issue was noted about the
communication process. The project team and the competency
centers held different opinions and perceptions about their
effectiveness and their counterpart's effectiveness in
providing corporate information. As mentioned above, the
competency centers felt that the downward flow of corporate
information was working well. However, some project leaders
held different opinions. The project leaders saw their role
in the communication process as being the communication of
project specific issues.
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I have very little communication with my team on corporate
issues. Most of the time, I have conversations with them
and we communicate issues from a project standpoint. In
other words, "this is a task that we have as a project
team, to get this information together to go do a
presentation for a WEB (Workload Evaluation Board meeting)
or for a kickoff." (#23)
I try to avoid passing down corporate information as much
as possible. The only information I pass is what the
team's doing as a whole, what props we've got in to the
sponsor, areas trying to develop. ... The problem is,
early in the reorganization, CCs were saying one thing and
the Project Office was saying something else. So, I
thought we should focus more on the job and let the CC
take care of corporate information. (#6)
Some project leaders saw a breakdown in the communication
process in the competency centers and decided to include
corporate information in their team meetings.
The person on the project team, the person that they see
on a regular basis and the person they identify themselves
with, now is the project leader, because that's who
they're assigned to full time. So, I have taken on the
responsibility, in my weekly team meetings, those used to
be all project oriented, well now I take the first 10-15
minutes of my meetings to pass on corporate information
because they're not getting it from their CCs. (#20)
Unfortunately, given the way the CCs are structured
they're responsible for so many people, it's difficult for
them to reach all the people. Some of the CCs have
intermittent communication meetings and other CCs don't
have any. And so center-wide, the "what is the center
doing" kind of information doesn't seem to be there any
more like it used to. (#7)
Communication was seen as a process that is ongoing
and vital to the organization. Level three respondents felt
they had contributed large amounts of time and energy to
improving communication. However, they could not clearly
define or measure communication processes. Level three
concentrated on the formal communication channels
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(directorate/team/ competency center meeting, roundtable
discussions, newsletters, and computer E-mail) to convey
corporate information. Level three's efforts appear to have
met with some success. Their concern for downward
communication was not shared by the lower levels. Generally,
each level felt it was receiving corporate information as well
as could be expected. There were personnel concerns with such
issues as RIFs and forced retirements, but these were
mentioned more out of personal anxiety than a lack of
information from level three. The more telling aspect of
communication flow was the feelings in regard to upward
communication. Some respondents from levels three and two
were concerned that they were not getting enough information
from level one. While not clearly stated, these concerns were
over (1) what is bothering the level one members; upward flow
of downward corporate information, and (2) the need to get
level one more involved with the process decisions. At level
one, a feeling stated by respondents across directorates was
that level three was not aware of their processes and needed
to walk around more often to learn what was going on.
Horizonal communication was interesting in that a
difference of perspective was highlighted between tne
competency centers and project teams. The competency centers
felt that they were providing corporate information to their
people. They also felt that the project teams were providing
the same information to ensure everyone is receiving the
98
information. The project teams felt that they should only be
concerned with project specific information, but since their
team members were not getting it from the competency centers
they were using project time to pass on corporate information.
D. SUMMARY
NAWC has had mixed experiences with its reorganization.
On the positive side, teams voiced a feeling of working well
together and that they had been able to implement better
solutions. As the competency center teams have become more
self-sufficient, associates are redefining their managerial
roles to become more of a monitor and coordinator. With the
increased access to necessary information, team members feel
that they are able to solve their own team problems without
the assistance of the management hierarchy. Team members are
looking at the "big picture" of how their individual tasks fit
into organizational processes. This has been reinforced by
NAWC's management who focus on organizational or production
processes as criteria for decision making. Teams are
recognizing the importance of inter-team cooperation in
meeting their project goals. Upper management recognizes the
need to break down the barriers between the old operations and
support functions by moving to a Level Three Directors
concept. The most significant positive effect has been the
flow of corporate information downward from level three to
level two to level one.
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Challenges still face NAWC. Many teams are still
struggling with learning how to work together as teams.
Conflict is still very strong between the competency centers
and the project teams. These groups are having trouble
interacting effectively. This is due, in part, to lack of
clarity regarding the management of direct and indirect cost
activities. Additionally, the organization has not clearly
visualized or implemented a communication network that
corresponds with the new organization.
Although the intent of this paper was not to test the
hypotheses presented in Chapter III, the themes identified
during the interviews did reflect some of the ideas presented
by the hypotheses.
(Systems perspective). NAWC-ADI has focused primarily on
structure and process orientation during its reorganization.
They have not addressed the interaction between their new
matrix organizational structure and other organizational
components (such as personnel appraisals, promotions, or
rewards). As described in Chapter III, organizations contain
systems that interact and impact on each other. If one system
(structure) is changed, the other systems will be affected.
NAWC-ADI has tried to define their new organization by being
process oriented. However, this orientation has primarily
focused on production processes and has ignored such systems
as human resources, informal communication, and feedback
processes.
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(Frustration) The reorganization has created some negative
reaction among '4,WC-ADI employees, but personnel interviewed
were able to point to specific processes (production
processes, proposal processes, and personnel issues) that were
not working well instead of blaming their frustration entirely
on the reorganization.
(Conflict) As the requirement for coordination and
cooperation between the project teams and competency centers
increased, conflict did surface. This conflict has primarily
been between the project teams and the competency centers in
Beta. The project teams identified certain pathologies (Davis
and Lawarence) within the competency centers. These
pathologies included such issues as excess overhead (or
indirect costs), decision strangulation within the CSTs (the
need for all decision to be made by group consensus vice one
consistent voice has lead to inconsistent processes procedures
and multiple points of contact), and power struggles between
project teams and competency centers for organizational assets
(equipment and personnel). Part of the conflict within NAWC-
ADI is due to the lack of clear boundry identification between
the project office and the competency centers. This has
resulted in confusion regarding the balance of power between
project teams and competency centers. The project teams are
now perceived as the power base within NAWC-ADI and the other
directorates serve a support function. This implies that all
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parts of the organization have not been fully integrated in
the reorganization.
(Horizonal communication) The requirement for lower levels
to communicate horizonally has certainly increased. This
increased flow has not necessarily meant increased
communication quality. The higher level managers have
concentrated primarily on vertical corporate information, due,
in part, to the importance of base closures and realignment.
However, NAWC-ADI has not been able to identify a new
communication network to align with its organizational network
(structure). At the present time, communication appears to be
flowing through the matrix structure (competency centers and
project teams), but few people strongly support the idea that
the quality of horizonal communication had improved. This
could be the result of lower level employees not being
familiar with communicating outside of the traditional
vertical network. It could also relate to the negative
feelings associated with the increased levels of conflict
discussed above.
(Trip Wires) The "Trip Wires" identified by Hackman (1990)
were recognized during the interviews. No method for
evalutating team performance has been established. Team
members are still evaluated individually. Generally, teams
have been left to "work out the details" of self-management.
This has been especially true for the customer service teams
within the competency centers. Because sufficant resources
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have not been provided to train employees on intra and inter
team skills, the lower level teams have experienced the most
frustration. As Hackman states, it cannot be assumed that
teams have all the competence they need to work well as a
team.
The following chapter will address recommendations to
capitalize on NAWC's positive aspects and to assist with the
challenges identified above. The chapter will also suggest
areas for further research that would assist NAWC in moving
toward full implementation of its reorganization.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. MANAGEMENT
NAWC has invested large emounts of time and effort to
facilitate its reorganization. The greatest strength that
NAWC ý'as is its sincere desire to continue working on its
organizational development. NAWC must concern itself with the
influence of external factors as well as those internal to its
organization. Any significant organizational change such as
that instituted at NAWC-ADI will meet with resistance and
difficulties in managing the transition phase. The major
internal factors (both positive and negative) derived from the
reorganization were described in the prior chapter. But,
there are significant external factors also relevant to
understanding both the status of this reorganization and the
recommendations for future action.
Externally, the biggest issue facing NAWC is the reduction
in forces or downsizing which is facing the entire Department
of Defense. This issue involves the identification of excess
personnel, the best manner to reduce, and the selection
process for that reduction. This is not easy in that the only
means available to NAWC at the present time is voluntary
retirement or termination and an official reduction in force
(RIF). A RIF may not provide for the exact personnel or
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talents desired by NAWC, since the overriding criteria in a
RIF is seniority. This could have an adverse effect in
retaining the personnel best suited for NAWC's organizational
structure and culture.
The downsizing by RIFs is directly related to the external
control over NAWC by civil service rules and regulations.
These rules not only pertain to the RIF, but affect all
aspects of employee relations. The performance appraisal,
promotion, and grievance systems are all externally
controlled. To become more flexible, NAWC-ADI must find a way
to modify or eliminate some of the civil service rules that
are hindering organizational development. For example, the
performance appraisal system must become more orientated to
team functions and measurement of long term
project/organization goals. At the present time, the best
NAWC can hope for is to provide each individual with an
accurate job description and an individual performance
appraisal review. This does not reinforce the culture and
value of the team concept as discussed by Hackman (1990).
The major reorganization of NAWC, Headquarters, Aircraft
Division (NAWC-ADI's reporting senior) along the lines of that
undertaken by NAWC, Indianapolis will have an impact of how
NAWC-ADI will communicate with its chain of command and with
its customers. Although NAWC-ADI has taken the lead in the
Naval Air Systems Command on innovation and organizational
design, the reality of military organizations is that senior
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organizations in the chain of command tend to dictate to their
juniors the appropriate mechanisms for conducting business.
NAWC-ADI must be prepared to adjust to the new procedures
imposed on them from higher command. This is not to say that
they can not help in molding that relationship, but they (the
organization and personnel) must be ready to change some of
the policies that has been implemented over the past two
years. Perhaps the greatest danger for NAWC-ADI would be if
the NAWC, Headquarters, Aircraft Division's reorganization
were to try to standardize the policies and procedures
internal to all of the warfare centers. This could result in
creating a new bureaucracy as limiting as the old one. They
must continue to be flexible, while understanding the unique
external constraints of a military organization.
Internally, the relationship between the project office
and the competency centers, team development, conflict
management, and strategic fit throughout the organization must
be addressed. The organization's concept of operations needs
to reinforce the different roles of the project office and the
competency centers. Much of the frustration between these
groups appears to result from a lack of clear understanding
concerning the roles of each and the balance of power within
the organization. Drawing from Katz and Allen (1985), NAWC-
ADI needs to identify the specific roles of each directorate.
Power can no longer be seen as who has the boss' ear, but must
be contingent on the topic and area under discussion.
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The importance of team development as discussed by Davis
(1977) and Keller (1986) was presented in the literature
review. Without group cohesiveness, project teams and
customer service teams (CSTs) cannot be fully effective.
NAWC-ADI has concentrated heavily on project team development.
This is due to the fact that project teams did exist to some
extent before the reorganization and that they are central to
the customer focus of the new organization. However, the
lagging emphasis on the CSTs contributed to the frustration
and confusion that has developed between the project teams and
the CSTs. Recognizing the limited attention given to
clarifying level one's Concept of Operations, NAWC-ADI has
established a study group to develop a level one Concept of
Operations. The new Concept of Operations will provide the
outline for estabiishing and operating of CSTs, but that will
not ensure that the team will develop skills essential for
success.
In line with the cautions provided by Hackman's "Trip
Wires," NAWC needs to move away from the concept of individual
training (i.e., 40 hours for each person) and concentrate on
team skill development. Team members should not be treated as
individuals and need to be reinforced through organizational
supports. The project teams have learned a lot from trial and
error, but both could improve their group cohesiveness by
participating in specific training sessions built around group
dynamics. The funds targeted for individual career and
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technical development should be postponed until the gulf
between team skills has been bridged.
A significant portion of the team development should
concentrate on conflict management. Matrix organizations
create an environment that allows conflicts to surface more
often than more traditional organizations. As Barker (1988)
pointed out, those managers who confirmed that conflict did
exist and were co-operative in reaching team goals were more
successful then those that avoided conflict or took a
competitive approach to resolving it. NAWC-ADI has to
acknowledge that their personnel are communicating more often
and at a lower level than in the past. Even in an environment
where the mutual goals of the organization are paramount,
conflict will occur on the best ways to obtain those goals.
Conflict management training will identify the reality of
conflict in the new organization and provide the teams with
the ability to handle conflict without escalating it higher in
the organization.
After the level one Concept of Operations is developed,
all of the concept of operations and policies should be
compared. As the organization is focusing more on the
specific dynamics at each level, it should not forget about
the "gestalt." NAWC-ADI (using the Leverage Process) began
its reorganization by identifying structure as the major
constraint within the organization. Many changes have
occurred over the past two years. A lot of those changes have
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been in response to specific problems. An assessment of how
well all of the parts fit into the organization is needed.
The literature on systems models provide an excellent basis to
examine the strategic fit or congruence at NAWC-ADI. What
cultural changes have taken place or are still needed? What
personnel development programs are seen as hindering or as
helping to achieve the desired organizational climate? How is
NAWC-ADI interacting with its external environment different
than two years ago? NAWC-ADI's managers need to move away
from the idea of one constraint and deal with the interaction
between organizational components.
B. FURTHER RESEARCH
NAWC provides an interesting organization for further
research. The change process itself requires further study,
before the corporate information is lost. A case study on the
reorganization would contribute to an understanding of the
dynamics of change in a large organization in general and in
a public sector organization in particular. Topics such as
who led the change, what was the felt need, and how was the
process initially carried out would contribute to the
understanding of organizational change and resistance to
change.
Research on specific processes would contribute to a
better understanding of the interaction between organizational
components in a public sector organization. An understanding
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of the effect of unit costing and Defense Business Operations
Funds (DBOF) would provide insight into the issues of direct
and indirect funding at NAWC-ADI and military organizations.
This could be extended to include a study of the ways in which
the DBOF system acts as a driving force or hinderance to an
organization (such as NAWC-ADI) trying to adjust to the new
defense environment.
A study of the production management aspects at NAWC-ADI
would facilitate a more comprehensive picture of process
problems. Production management is the life blood of NAWC.
If the end product is the purpose, then the production process
is the how of an organization. The types of scheduling
techniques, manufacturing software, inventory models and
quality assurance procedures utilized at NAWC would help to
determine if the organizational innovations have been
superficial or have permeated the entire organization.
Additional research is needed on the personnel issues in
a public sector organization that is no longer conducting
itself in a traditional bureaucratic manner. How does a
personnel system imposed on an innovative organization effect
the change process? Is it treated as an external factor or as
an internal constraint? Can bureaucratic civil service career
patterns and complex grievance procedures coexist in a dynamic
organization which is adjusting to customer demand?
Additional research is needed throughout the public sector
(especially in the Department of Defense) to identify those
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organizations that have attempted large scale change. The
question for NAWC and the entire Department of Defense is how
can a government organization become an organization that
learns from and interacts with the clients or customers that
it is designed to serve, while being controlled and directed
by its political environment.
iii
APPENDIX A
NAVY RDT&E WARFARE CENTERS
ORGANIZATION CHART
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
I
NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMANDI


























C~t I !I I
04 c eiixin a
~~~ 0e0.*g
E-1'
o n 20 1













When a large-scale change occurs in an organization this size,
members often have difficulty reading off the same page,
understanding the strategies, policies, and procedures that
top managers are generating. Often the top managers
experience these misunderstandings as communication
breakdowns. We would like to ask you some questions regarding
your experience of communicating your intentions (by way of
policies, procedures, strategies, decisions) to level 1 and
level 2 people in the organization. We would also like to ask
you some questions regarding decision making procedures in the
organization in general. Basically, we want to understand 1.)
how the larger vision is generated among top managers, 2.)
what is working well when members are aligning themselves with
the larger vision, and 3.) what gets in the way of members
aligning themselves with the new vision for the organization.
We would like you to be as specific as possible, that is to
tell of concrete instances when you experienced the
reorganization working well (e.g., times when participation in
decision making was successful, when diverse groups
participated in decision, when people felt empowered to
initiate new actions, when people invested the time to seek
consensus for a tough decision, times when innovative ideas
were generated). Also, tell us of instances when things were
not working so well.
Interview Questions:
1. Think of a time when the re-organization worked well.
What was going on? Who in this organization has thrived under
the new design?
(get success story in regards to how levels one and
two performed)
(what are the indicators that things are working
well?)
(what do you see as the communication strengths of the
Center? -- what's working?)
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2. When this study was initiated, there was a feeling among
members of the LTD that there were problems with communication
particularly as a result of the restructuring. What are the
indicators that signal this for you? How will you know when
communication problems have been resolved?
(what do you see as the communication weaknesses of
the Center? -- what's not working?)
3. In general, what do you think about the way decisions get
made around here since the re-organization?
(probe: what do you need to make good decisions, e.g.,
what info, input from others...)
4. How well do others in the organization (LI, L2, or even
L3) understand decision/policies/strategies since the re-
organization?
(how do they understand and support your intentions?)
(what are the indicators?)
(look for times when L2 and L3 understood or failed to
understand.. .What happened or failed to happen?)
5. What do you hope to get out of this study?
Other possible probes:
One indicator could be productivity. What aspects of
communication do you feel have the most significant impact on
productivity?
Given the near horizon, mid horizon, and far horizon
responsibilities of the three levels of the organization, how
do these relate to the challenges in communication? What far
horizon information needs to be communicated to L2 and LI?
How is it being communicated? Is this effective? Same
questions for mid horizon communications to L3 and L1, and
near horizon communications to L2 and L3.
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Levels Two and One
Introductory Statement:
When a large-scale change occurs in an organization this size,
members often have trouble adjusting to the new requirements.
Often everything that seemed familiar, like roles, reporting
relationships, even simple work procedures are changed and
more often than not this can cause confusion. We are
interested in understanding how you have experienced this re-
organization. In particular, we are interested in knowing
when and how the new organization has worked well, when and
how people are thriving under the new system. Also, we are
interested in understanding what is not working well, what
gets in the way of people's performance, what seems confusing,
or hinders work flow. We will be asking you questions about
your experience of this change process.
Interview Questions:
1. First of all, we would like you to think of a time when
you experienced the organization working well as a result of
the change. It could involve you personally, your work group,
or someone else in the organization. What was going on? What
made it successful?
2. What is the most difficult challenge you have experienced
since the re-organization? What made it difficult?
3. What don't each of the other 2 groups understand about the




organizational mission, goals, longer term strategies
Mid horizon
policies, customer opportunities, human resource
development, process improvements, new programs
Near horizon
task-related information, performance feedback, career
development and advancement opportunities
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Other probes continued:
1. Ways you can learn about these areas:
a. What information in these areas do you currently
receive?
b. How do you receive it? From whom?
c. What additional information in these areas would
you like to receive?
d. Who would the information come from?
e. Why do you think you aren't getting it now?
2. Ways you communicate about these:
a. What information in these areas are you
responsible for communicating to others?
b. How and to whom?
c. How do you make the decision to initiate
communication?
d. What requests for information do you receive?
e. What happens when you communicate across levels
or teams (other directorates, project office, etc)?
Are they responsive? Where is the greatest lag or
block? Why?
3. Describe the communication relationship you have with:
a. Peers within your competency center
b. Peers within other competency centers
c. Project office
d. Other 2 levels
4. What are the communication strengths of the organization
(what's working)?
5. What are the major communication weaknesses of the
organization (what's not working)?
6. What would you like to see done to improve communication
here?
a. Why hasn't it been done already?
b. What are the major obstacles?




WordPerfect (5.1) has the capability of performing sorting
operations. In combination with the blocking and copying
options, the sorting function was utilized to arrange
highlighted sections (topics) from the NAWC interviews.
To establish a topic file and to sort, certain
prerequisites were required. First, the appropriate sections
of the transcribed interviews were highlighted and coded. The
codes were as follows: Topic (4 digit); Level (3 digit);
Group (2 digit); Project (2 digit); Interviewee (2 digit);
Interviewer (2 digit); and Interview Number (2 digit). The
four digit topic code allowed for the first two digits to
represent the general topic and the last two digits to
represent subgroupings (ie., 1200 = Personnel Management,
1220 = Advancement/Career, 1230 = Performance Evaluations).
Second, the computer file was required for each interview.
The code numbers and highlighted sections could have been
manually inputed into a separate data file and then sorted by
the methods listed below. However, utilizing the procedures
outlined below, the data was transferred directly from the
interview file to the newly created topic file. The
procedures presented below can be found in the WordPerfect
Workbook, which comes which the software program, or most
commercial how-to computer books written about WordPerfect
(5.1).
Procedures to create and sort a topic file.
1. Access an interview from the data file.
2. Split the computer screen. (Cntl F3, 1=Window, 12=Number
of lines, Enter)
3. Move cursor to bottom screen. (Shift F3)
4. Type line of code for first quote and hit Enter. The
codes need to be separated by a tab (for example,
1200 3PL 14 05). (See a reference book for definition
of lines and fields.)
5. Move cursor to top screen. (Shift F3)
6. Locate the appropriate passage to be transferred and
highlight using the block option. (Alt F4) Move cursor
until the entire section is high lighted.
7. Copy the highlighted section to the bottom screen.
(Cntl F4, l=block, 2=copy, Shift F3 moves cursor to
bottom screen, Enter copies the text in the new position)
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8. Move cursor to end of text and hit Enter twice.
(Paragraph sort requires double spacing between text
to distinguish data input.)
9. Type in the code for the next quote and repeat numbers
4-8 until all sections of the interview have been
completed. (A sort can be performed after each interview
or after a number of interviews.)
10. After all quotes have been copied from a particular
interview, move to the top screen and exit. (Shift F3,
F7, Y=Save document, Enter=Document saved under previous
name, Y=Replace previous file, Y=Exit document 1).
11. Close top screen. (Shift F3 to move cursor to bottom
screen, Cntl F3, 1=Window, O=Number of lines, Enter)
12. Save new topic file. (F10, type in appropriate
drive:name)
13. Begin sort process. (Cntl F9, 2=Sort, Enter=Input file
to sort:(screen), "new drive:file name"=Output file for
sort:)
14. Input sort characteristics. (7=Type sort, 3=Paragraph
sort; 6=Order, A=Ascending; 3=Key, A=Alphanumeric type,
1=Line, l=Field, l=Word, F7=Exit) (Sort can be performed
on up to nine separate keys)
15. Perform sort. (l=Perform action)
16. Exit topic file. (F7, Y=Save document, Enter=Save under
existing name, Y=replace original topic file, N=Not exit
WordPerfect)
17. Access sorted topic file. (F5, "drive:"=drive file is
stored on, Enter=Go to drive directory, move cursor to
appropriate file and hit 1 to recall data file to screen)
18. Print sorted topic file. (Shift F7, l=Full document,
other options are available)
19. Exit sorted topic file. (Repeat procedures in item 15,
except change N to Y=exit WordPerfect)
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